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WHY CORPORATE DEVIANCE IS NOT
TREATED AS A CRIME - THE NEED TO
MAKE "PROFITS" A DIRTY WORD
BY H. J. GLASBEEK*
In an indictment of a system which permits corporations - literally - to get
away with what would be deemed criminal in a non-corporate setting, Professor
Glasbeek examines a number of theories that apologize for and purportedly
explain this phenomenon. He presents a compelling argument that corporate
decision makers and controlling shareholders are exempted from culpability be-
cause they are members of or closely associated with the ruling class. His con-
clusion includes a rationale for changing the manner in which corporate wrong-
doers are perceived (by regulators, legislators, the judiciary and society) so that
sanctions will attach to criminals regardless of class.
I. INTRODUCTION
Horrified by violence in the workplace, Rowland and I wrote an
article' in which we argued that it would be beneficial for society to use
its ultimate sanction to demonstrate its moral abhorrence of the selec-
tive infliction of harm on one class of society's members: workers. That
is, we wanted to apply the force and vigour of criminal law to work-
place "accidents". We argued that, given the failure of normal regula-
tory systems to provide even a reasonably safe environment, drastic
measures were in order. Much of the article demonstrated that injuries
and deaths in the workplace could be treated as assaults and killings of
the kind normally sought to be controlled by the criminal law proper,
rather than by civil or administrative schemes. We felt that we fur-
nished a plausible set of arguments. But some questions remained un-
answered: Why had the criminal law seldom been so used? Why was,
and is, there no real inclination to move in that direction?
These questions have posed serious conceptual problems for main-
stream criminal lawyers and criminologists. They have had to offer ex-
o Copyright, 1984, H. J. Glasbeek.
* Professor and Director of Graduate Programme in Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. A
preliminary version of this paper was delivered at the 35th Annual Meeting of the American
Society of Criminology, Denver, 9-13 Nov., 1983.
1 Glasbeek & Rowland, Are Injuring and Killing at Work Crimes? (1979), 17 Osgoode Hall
L. J. 506.
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planations as to why corporate' wrongdoing is rarely perceived or
treated as criminal behaviour. In this paper, I want to show not just
that the arguments they have addressed are tendentious and, often, il-
logical, but also that the need to make them arises only because these
traditional scholars make unwarranted assumptions about the nature
and purposes of criminal law and of corporations. In particular, their
underlying belief (which leads to a variety of sophisticated theories) is
that there is a societal consensus about what conduct should be termed
criminal and what should not. As to the nature of corporations, a socio-
logical lore has grown up deeming corporations to be much like other
organizations, at least in respect of deviant behaviour. These starting
positions pose a conundrum for conventional wisdomeers: on the one
hand, they demand evenhanded treatment for behaviour which appears
to be criminal, on the basis of the perceived consensus about values,
while on the other hand, the difficulty of applying criminal law focused
on human behaviour does not make obvious sense when asked to deal
with a dynamic entity - an organization - which transcends individ-
ual human beings' motivations. Inevitably, their discussion seeks either
to explain away the lack of evenhanded treatment, or to argue that
organizational restructuring is better than the crude application of
criminal law if less deviant behaviour is the purpose of reform. I aim to
establish that, if a different approach is taken to the genesis and nature
of criminal law, the differential treatment of apparently similar beha-
viour will be seen to be exactly what is meant to happen. The argument
will be that idealized economic premises of a particular kind - the
tenets of free enterprise - mandate the results obtained and that crim-
inal punishment is to be reserved for certain people and classes, not for
others. That is, a variant of the conflict paradigm is offered as an ex-
planatory theory for what happens.' The special organizational aspects
of corporate life will also be addressed from this perspective. Then I
will show how advantage might be taken of the predominance of the
consensual paradigm in our ideological framework to draw attention to
the contradictions inherent in law in general, and to the plight of the
victims of corporate crime in particular.
" The central argument of this article is wrongdoing by corporations. The more general ques-
tions which arose from the first article had particular meaning in respect of corporations; most of
the workforce in the private sector is employed by corporations.
3 The terms "consensus" and "conflict" are used as descriptive of poles at opposite ends of a
theoretical spectrum. There are many varieties of both consensus and conflict theories. For the
purpose of the analysis herein, however, these are grouped under an umbrella so that the essential
difference between the two categories can be examined, that difference being that consensus theo-
ries do not, and conflict theories do, emphasize power differentials as vital in explaining the crimi-
nal law system. See text accompanying notes 96-101, infra.
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II. CORPORATE WRONGDOING AS A PROBLEM FOR CON-
SENSUS THEORISTS: PREVALENCE AND IMPACT
The seminal work leading to the study of corporate crime in its
own right was done by Sutherland.4 His investigations demonstrated
that major corporations frequently broke the law and he argued that, if
the usual approach to deviance from legal duties and standards were
adopted, corporations would be treated as criminals. As it is evident
that this seldom happens, an impetus has been provided for research in
the area. The apparent lack of evenhandedness is suggestive of failure
of consensual and liberal theory.
Beleaguered consensus theorists have already had to deal with the
embarrassingly well-documented fact that rich people commit a great
number of crimes,5 are disproportionately less often prosecuted and, if
prosecuted, less often convicted than poor people. Moreover, even when
convicted, their sentences are lighter than those of poor people, and
they get preferred treatment in the parole system.6 Fortunately, these
disparities can either be explained or justified by reference to factors
which leave the consensual framework largely intact. This is done by
contending that some of the difficulties arise from those associated with
giving effect to any complex system, rather than being due to inherent
problems. Such "natural" difficulties include the political biases of pub-
lic officials and police forces in favour of well-to-do people, and the
inadequate provision of legal representation for the poor.7 Such mal-
functioning clearly can be remedied, at least in theory, whilst leaving
the conceptual framework - the consensus analysis - firmly in place.
Other justifications for what seems to be the selective use of criminal
law against the poor may be found in theories surrounding the causa-
tion of crime. Such causal theories include theories of strain,8 which
assume that crime is due to heightened levels of frustration leading to
4 Some of Sutherland's most important works include: White Collar Criminality (1940), 5
Am. Soc. Rev. 1; Crime and Business (1941), 217 Annals 112; Is "White Collar Crime" Crime?
(1945), 10 Am. Soc. Rev. 132; White Collar Crime (1949).
5 There is much American research to this effect, e.g. Erikson & Empey, Class Positions,
Peers and Delinquency (1965), 49 Soc'y & Soc. Research 268; Hidden Delinquency and Social
Status (1966), 44 Social Forces 546; Williams & Gold, From Delinquent Behavior to Official
Delinquency (1972), 20 Soc. Probs. 209; Gold, Undetected Delinquent Behavior (1966), 3 J. of
Research in Crime & Delinquency 27; Doleschal, Hidden Crime (1970), 2 Crime & Delinquency
Lit. 546.
6 Thornberry, Race, Socioeconomic Status and Sentencing in the Juvenile System (1973), 66
J. Crim. Law & Criminology 90.
7 Reiman, The Rich Get Richer and the Poor Get Prison: Ideology, Class and Criminal
Justice (1979) at 104, and references cited there.
8 Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression (1939).
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non-conforming aggression, notions of anomie,9 which suggest that,
when cultural goals seem unreachable by legitimate means, some peo-
ple will turn to criminal means to obtain them. Such tendencies will be
strongest in those who have the greatest barriers to achievement: the
ill-educated, the poor. Moreover, the likelihood that frustration and im-
potence will result in deviance is increased when the conventional bonds
which tie actors to their environment are weak, when the domestic situ-
ation is not stable, where school does not have its usual overwhelming
influence and where steady work with its associated discipline is nota-
bly absent.10 Again, these circumstances will prevail in disproportionate
quantum amongst the poor. Add to these theories the labelling theory,
which holds that once people (especially those with feeble conventional
bonds) have been identified as deviants, the probability of future crimi-
nal behaviour is augmented.""
While all these theories may have some merit, they do not explain
why so many well-to-do people commit crimes. 2 On the other hand,
over time, the vigorous advocacy of the causality theories has undoubt-
edly influenced law-makers, judges and the police to hold the honest
belief that most of the real problems to be controlled through the crim-
inal law system arise from non-conforming behaviour by poor people.
In this context, the lack of evenhandedness, while regrettable, is not
seen as a serious cause for alarm by those who adhere to an idealized
consensus model for their theoretical understanding of the law.
Sutherland made visible a kind of actor, the corporation, whose
deviant conduct could not be attributed to any of the causal theories
the behavioural sciences had spawned. Further, the impact of corporate
deviance on the victims was enormous. Estimates abound to the effect
that the adverse economic effect of corporate wrongdoing vastly out-
strips that caused by mortal criminals. Thieves, muggers, bank robbers
and confidence tricksters are truly small-time when compared with
anti-trust conspirators, government bribers, false labellers and unsafe
producers.' 3 Once it became recognized that both the incidence and the
I Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (1957).
'0 Hirschi, Causes of Delinquency (1969); Glaser, "A Review of Crime: Causation Theory
and its Application," in Morris & Torny, eds., I Crime & Justice (1979) at 203.
11 Becker, Outsiders (1963); Schur, Labeling Deviant Behaviour (1971).
12 Although they, too, can suffer from anomie, have weak conventional bonds, etc. See Hir-
schi, supra note 10.
13 While such measurements are unavailable in Canada, attempts have been made elsewhere.
The differences between white collar crime, corporate crime and street crime are difficult to de-
fine, but the figures are so mindboggling that this becomes a quibble. In A Handbook on White-
Collar Crime (1974), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce reported the cost of white collar crime to
be just under $42 billion - ten times the total amount taken in all thefts reported in the FBI
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consequences of corporate deviance were large, the problem for main-
taining the appearance of neutrality of the law was real. The possibility
had to be faced that a Marxian conflict model of criminal law (positing
that it is the coercive force used by the State to repress class struggle in
order to serve the ruling classes) would become a more plausible ana-
lytical framework than a functional/consensus model. In large part, the
scholarship in this area is a (perhaps often unconscious) reaction to this
angst. Explanations for the lack of evenhandedness are offered on the
basis that corporate crime is difficult to prove, at one end because of its
diffuse effect,"4 at the other end because of its diffuse commission;1" it
is also argued that corporations are not the proper subject of criminal
law because they are not humans (in the sense either that they cannot
possess mens rea or that, like all organizations, they are inherently de-
viant). 16 Purported justifications for different treatment are to the ef-
fect that punishment of corporations leads to unwarranted side-ef-
fects, 7 that thd wrong people ("innocent" shareholders, creditors,
workers) will be punished,18 that it costs too much to prosecute corpo-
rate crime, especially since it diminishes resources which ought to be
devoted to other criminal conduct and that the training of special inves-
tigators is expensive.' 9
The need to make these arguments arises, in part, because the con-
sensus theorist assumes that breaches of penal laws amount to crime.
The gravity of corporate crime then becomes a serious problem. The
breach of a provision of an occupational health statute by an employer
would not, by itself, be more serious than a violation by a car owner of
a parking bylaw. A light fine, even a reprimand, for both offenders
would amount to equal treatment. And, by and large, this is what hap-
pens. But the consensus analysts are confronted by the unpalatable fact
Index and 250 times the amount taken in all bank robberies in the U.S. in that year. See Reiman,
supra note 7 at 106 et seq.; also Clinard & Yeager, Corporate Crime (1980); Task Force Report
of the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Crime and its
Impact - An Assessment (1967); Conklin, Illegal But Not Criminal (1977); Box, Power, Crime
and Mystification (1983).
14 Many people may be affected to a small extent, unaware of this or of one another.
15 It may well be difficult to isolate one particular actor or, indeed, one complete act which
can be labelled deviant, as complex organizational models fragment decision-making and divide
labour. See text accompanying notes 81-95, infra.
18 Id.
"7 In the extreme, it may be argued, it will lead to the withdrawal of risk capital from the
market, not only by the particular corporation, but by other investors.
'" See text accompanying notes 68-72, infra and, generally, Williams, Criminal Law: The
General Part (2nd ed., 1961) at para. 283 et seq.
19 E.g. Richard, Introductiov Symposium on White-Collar Crime (1980), 53 Temple L.Q.
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that breach of an occupational health statute often (usually?) has a far
greater adverse impact than the breach of the law dealing with murder
or assault (that is, one which deals with acts which cause great and
tangible harm). The demand for evenhandedness, in the sense of impos-
ing more than a fine or to reprimand, thus arises from the knowledge
that illegal corporate activity imposes concrete and serious injury.
While the consensus theorists regard the gravity of the harm as very
important, it cannot be their final determinant of whether or not the
behaviour which inflicts the harm is so unacceptable that it must be
characterized as criminal, in the sense that it will attract the full force
of the criminal law as that is applied to "street" crime. This can be
illustrated rather easily.
The present economic depression/recession (choose one) has many
causes. One of its effects is a level of unemployment which some (I for
one) think is intolerable. There can be no gainsaying that it causes ter-
rible harm: loss of educational opportunities, lowering of living stan-
dards to the point of deprivation as people are rendered homeless and
left hungry, creation of emotional and psychological stress which causes
increased rates of suicide and alcoholism, all of which heighten the ten-
dency (the need?) to commit crimes.2 0 In short, people are dispos-
sessed, made desperate. Yet, it cannot be argued that there is a dearth
of productive work which could be done, some would say needs to be
done: There are housing shortages, short-staffed hospitals, roads and
streets in disrepair, transit systems lacking equipment and workers,
technological devices and machinery needing to be invented, designed
and produced for environmental protection. People could be employed.
One of the major reasons they are not is that other individuals, who
have the means to fund such work-creating and socially useful projects,
do not do so because they believe that they will not make sufficient
profit from such investments. Indeed, the level of unemployment has
become what it is as they have deinvested because profits no longer
accrued at all or only to an unsatisfactory extent. These investors and
potential investors - capitalists - have made deliberate decisions
which cause harm. As it happens, most of these "people" turn out to be
corporations. To my knowledge, the scholars in the area of corporate
crime have not claimed that this refusal to invest or to continue to in-
20 See Brenner, "Estimating the Social Costs of National Policy and Implication for Mental
Health and Criminal Aggression," in Social Planning Council of Metropolitan Toronto, Full Em-
ployment: Social Questions for Public Policy (1979); Cobb & Karl, Termination: The Conse-
quences of Job Loss (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 1977); see generally, Social Planning Council of
Metropolitan Toronto, The Social Impacts of Layoffs (Working Papers for Full Employment #3,
1980).
[VOL. 22, No. 3
Corporate Deviance
vest is deviant or criminal. It may be that this is because would-be
investors or investors are themselves victims of the workings of an eco-
nomic system for which others (the State) or no one is responsible. I
would merely note that this does not seem to be an available defence
for a welfare mother when she is charged for not revealing that she had
some money of her own which she could have spent on her dependent
children. Coercion by "the system" is not the difference between the
cases. It is crystal clear why the refusal to invest is not treated as devi-
ant or criminal: the conduct is exactly what is wanted from a corpora-
tion which lives up to the expectations for which it was created. For
this reason, the horrible consequences of such model behaviour are,
from the standard legal and moral points of view, inconsequential.
While some may think the illustration not very helpful because it
addresses the issue by way of a reductio ad absurdum argument (a
form of reasoning which is seldom an aid to understanding and solving
real life problems), it was chosen for a reason which will become
clearer below. In the meanwhile, the next illustration will demonstrate
that, not only do the incidence and gravity of harm, by themselves, not
characterize an act as either criminal or non-criminal (that would ig-
nore the nature of the act which caused the harm), but that the law
treats apparently identical conduct, causing the same harm, differently.
Thus, drinking to excess, knowing that a car will be driven and then
driving in that condition will permit the conviction of the driver. If
someone is injured, the driver may be convicted of criminal negligence
or manslaughter because driving in these circumstances exhibits a reck-
lessness towards human life and limb which amounts to mens rea.2'
Conversely, if an experienced builder carefully plans the construction
of an eighty-storey building, knowing that for every ten storeys above
fifty a worker on the site will be seriously hurt, the builder will not be
deemed to have had the necessary mens rea to warrant conviction of
criminal negligence or manslaughter when three workers are hurt. It
cannot be contended that a dangerous situation was not knowingly cre-
ated. Indeed, if anything, this case is worse: it is unlikely that the
drunk driver planned the escapade. To distinguish the two cases (that
is, to justify the different treatment by the criminal system), the argu-
ment which suggests itself is that the builder's harm-causing conduct
was not immoral.22 Presumably, the driver's harm-causing conduct was
21 See R. v. Savoie, [1954] 3 D.L.R. 665, (1956), 117 C.C.C. 327 (N.B.C.A.); R. v. Fortin
(1967), 121 C.C.C. 345 (N.B.C.A.); McCarthy v. The King (1921), 62 S.C.R. 40, 59 D.L.R. 206,
aff'g 57 D.L.R. 43.
22 Faced with making the distinction Howard, in Australian Criminal Law (2nd ed., 1975)
at 46-47 was unusually candid about the difficulty, but offered no explanation:
1984]
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morally unacceptable. Thus, in addition to the gravity of the conse-
quences, the morality of the harm-inflicting actor is important to the
consensual theory.
III. THE SUPPOSED LINK BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW AND
MORALITY IN CONSENSUS THEORY - THE BUILT-IN
DIFFICULTY
Only a simplified account of the underlying notions of liberal (con-
sensus) theorists (those to whom neutrality of law is important) is
presented.
Each juristic person starts with a bundle of inherent rights the en-
hancement and protection of which the State facilitates and the State
is given coercive power to this end. This, in itself, presents a danger to
the individuals as the State may abuse its overwhelming power. Con-
straints on its use must, therefore, be imposed. In this light, the most
repressive aspect of State power - its right to command people under
pain of punishment from fines to incarcerations to execution - should
only be available where the conduct of individuals threatens to rent the
delicate social fabric woven by the consensus of society's members. The
consensus revolves around the inherent rights of individuals. Because it
is essential to this model that individuals be given freedom to act to
achieve their legitimate aims, the State will have to assume that, when
it is feared that a person has unwarrantedly interfered with another's
rights, the suspect is innocent until proven guilty. Moreover, the State
ought to start from the position that conduct is not criminal in order to
maximize the potential for individuals to pursue their own aims in their
own way. Before conduct can attract the coercive power of the State in
its most trenchant form - application of criminal law - it must be
established that the conduct is harmful to essential social values. Thus,
not all behaviour which might be morally condemned will be consid-
ered criminal. In addition, it must be deleterious to important, shared
D may be in charge of a dangerous constructional operation such as tunnelling through a
rock. It may be a statistical certainty that over a period of one month at least one man
under his command will be killed. D will nevertheless not be guilty of murder if he knows
the statistics and orders the work to proceed. It is difficult to draw a satisfactory distinction
between cases where foresight of certainty is equivalent to intention in murder and cases
where it is not. The difference does not lie in the introduction of statistics, for these, when
used predictively, merely express a degree of probability in a conveniently exact form.
Neither does the difference lie in the lawfulness of D's activity, apart from the homicide,
for a man lawfully blasting holes in rock would be guilty of murder if he knew that by
setting off the charge he would certainly kill a trespassing onlooker.
Certain people, then, may be killed with impunity, others not. In the Howard hypothesis, note that
it is non-culpable to kill a productive, useful worker, but not an idle trespasser. This is raised to
foreshadow the argument made below about the nature of the legal system's bias.
[VOL. 22, No. 3
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To better understand the import of this model, it is useful to com-
pare it to the civil branch of the law, that is, when individuals seek
redress from other individuals. Redress will be based on the notion that
a social value requires legal support (for example, sanctity of a bargain,
freedom to do what one likes on one's own property, right to rely on
reasonable driving by another, protection of reputation, and so forth).
The remedies available are not always very different from the punish-
ments imposed by criminal law. Fines and damage awards do not differ
in their impact; indeed, the latter may inflict much greater economic
distress on the "loser" in the case and the economic cost of damages
might even exceed the pain of incarceration. In civil cases there is, of
course, no equivalent to the death penalty. But, even though there is
not complete symmetry between civil remedies and criminal sanctions,
very often the objectives sought are congruent. Thus, it is common to
argue that success in a civil action is to be based on whether a remedy
would appease the plaintiff, ethically punish the defendant, satisfy the
need to have the defendant ethically compensate the victim, provide
specific deterrence so that the defendant will not act wrongfully again
and deter others from such behaviour. 24 Criminal lawyers and criminol-
ogists will recognize these goals! Further, in many kinds of civil actions
(such as trespass, defamation, contract and even some negligence
cases),25 punitive damages are awarded which, in effect, impose serious
fines on the civil wrongdoer. Moreover, even when other forms of legal
regulation or administrative control are used, some of the goals will
coincide with those of the criminal/civil law (for instance, specific and
general deterrence and compensation of victims). All of this suggests
23 Although this simplified model may offend the more sophisticated, it served as the point of
departure for a major review of criminal law undertaken by the Law Reform Commission of
Canada: Our Criminal Law (1976).
2 See Williams, The Aims of the Law of Tort (1951), 4. Curr. Leg. Probs. 137; Williams &
Hepple, Foundations of the Law of Tort (1976). While other raisons d'&tre for the law of torts
are offered, these form the core of the conventional wisdom, i.e. of the legal consensus theorists.
Just as consensus theory proves unsound in the criminal law area, so it fails as an explanatory
mode in the civil sphere, see Glasbeek & Hasson, "Fault, The Great Hoax", Klar, ed., Studies in
Canadian Tort Law (1977) at 395.
25 Punitive damages have always been part of trespass and defamation actions, such actions
being closely related to criminal laws. More recently, there has been some judicial movement to
impose punitive damages when employees are wrongfully dismissed; note the progression from
Cox v. Phillips Industries, [1976] 3 All E.R. 161, 1 W.L.R. 638 (Q.B.), to Pilon v. Peugeot
Canada Ltd. (1980), 29 O.R. (2d) 711 (Ont. S.C.) to Cornell v. Pfizer C. & G. Inc. (1981), 81
C.L.L.C. 14,103, 23 C.P.C. 286 (Ont. H.C.). Punitive damages have also been awarded in negli-
gence cases, the best known in recent times being Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Compamy (1981),
174 Cal. R. 348, 119 Cal. App. Rep. (3d) 757 and, in Canada, Robitaille v. Vancouver Hockey
Club Ltd. (1981), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 568 (B.C.C.A.) afi'd, [1981] 6 W.W.R. 577, 26 B.C.L.R. 1.
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that there must be a good deal of overlap in the aims and objectives of
criminal and civil law (and administrative regulation). In particular,
there must be a great deal of coincidence in the social values sought to
be protected. The question this raises is: When is it appropriate to fur-
ther such social values through the use of the repressive power of the
State rather than through the civil or administrative mechanisms? Re-
member that for the adherents to the liberal/consensus model this
question is raised from within a framework which assumes that the
State should be inhibited in its use of its coercive powers.
The answer must be that the criminal law is attracted when the
conduct is such that, in addition to sanctions of a kind which can be
inflicted civilly or administratively, public condemnation and stigma
are to be attached to it. The social value attacked must be vital, the
way in which it is violated reprehensible. When the social value in
question is essential to social cohesion, it is relatively easy to hold
criminalization appropriate. The most obvious example is that sanctity
of life must be respected. Violence to other individuals usually will be
deemed criminal. Killing or maiming of people may be held to be crim-
inal.26 But, after this relatively easy to agree upon category, what?
The difficulty with liberal rights' theories analysis is that, at bot-
tom, it is indeterminate. Much as it talks about fundamental, natural,
inherent, basic individualistic rights, it is able to identify such rights
only if agreement can be reached that conventional perception of those
rights is correct. If it is contended, as I do, that the conventional per-
ception of what reality is may itself be the product of a consciousness
created by the status quo, then the idea of inherent/fundamental indi-
vidualistic rights, unrelated to political organization, must be rejected.
The modern prophet of liberal rights' theorists, Ronald Dworkin, noted
that when a court is faced with the issue of determining if a legislative
or executive act violates a constitutional or fundamental right, the
court's approach must start from the proposition that "[a] claim of
right presupposes a moral argument and can be established in no other
way."'27 But where is the court to find the criteria to make the neces-
sary moral judgments? Dworkin argues that when judges are looking at
principle and morality to identify which rights ought to be enforced,
they are to search for institutional rights, those which can be extracted
from existing institutions and accepted practices. His advice to a judge
is:
26 Not all conduct with the certain consequence of physical harm will be held to be criminal,
see text accompanying note 22, supra.
27 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1978) at 147.
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The constitution sets out a general political scheme that is sufficiently just to
be taken as settled for reasons of fairness. Citizens take the benefit of living in a
society whose institutions are arranged and governed in accordance with that
scheme, and they must take the burdens as well, at least until a new scheme is
put into force either by discrete amendment or general revolution. But he must
then ask just what scheme of principles has been settled. He must construct, that
is, a constitutional theory . . . we may suppose that he can develop a full politi-
cal theory that justifies the constitution as a whole. It must be a scheme that fits
the particular rules of this constitution of course. 8
Inherent human rights are thus those which will help the status quo to
perpetuate itself. But, at any one time, these are hard to identify and
controversy will exist. For the consensus criminal law theorist, then, the
problem of which social values need to be protected through the crimi-
nal law system looms large.2 9
IV. FREE ENTERPRISE IDEALS AS THE MORAL BASIS FOR
CRIMINAL LAW
Whatever the extent of disagreement about basic social values, lib-
eral/consensus criminal law theorists assume the right of private own-
ership (although its scope may be a matter of contention) to be the
paradigm of rights to be defended by the criminal law system. 30 The
28 Id. 106. Although Dworkin here is speaking of constitutional adjudication, he unquestion-
ably would hold that the reasoning is applicable to all other spheres of adjudication. For a more
detailed working-out of the indeterminacy of liberal rights' theory, see Glasbeek & Mandel, "The
Legalization of Politics in Advanced Canadian Capitalism: The Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms," in Martin, ed., Critical Perspectives on the Constitution (forthcoming).
29 There is no obvious way to rank moral precepts. For instance, why should acts which
offend biblical notions - ingratitude, hardheartedness, absence of natural affection, habitual idle-
ness, avarice, sensuality, pride, covetousness - not be treated as crimes? See Stephen, 2 History
of the Criminal Law of England (1883). To avoid this, resort must be had to such notions as that
the conduct would fill reasonable persons with revulsion; see the famous essay, which is mandatory
reading for all criminal law students, by Lord Devlin, "The Enforcement of Morals" (1959),
Maccabean Lecture in Jurisprudence of the British Academy, reprinted in The Enforcement of
Morals (1965). This leads to derision by those who doubt the wisdom of the mythical reasonable
person, see Hart, Immorality and Treason (1959), 62 Listener 162. The Law Reform Commission
of Canada, supra note 23, at 20-25, simply argued that there were some broad categories of social
values which everyone could agree should be protected: order, rather than anarchy; peace, rather
than violence; honesty, rather than deceit; individual liberty rather than not; private ownership of
property. It failed, however, to indicate with much clarity whose order, liberty, ownership, etc., or
what qualitative aspects of these concepts, would be valued so highly. See text accompanying
notes 57-64, infra.
20 From Our Criminal Law, supra note 23, at 21:
One matter, though, deserves special mention - the value we set on private property. No
society today allows unbridled free enterprise and ownership. But no society today com-
pletely abolishes them. All societies compromise. Canada, like most Western countries,
finds its compromise close to the private ownership end of the spectrum. Hence the place
traditionally given in our criminal law to property offences. Our paradigm of crime is theft.
The confidence with which this is stated contrasts sharply with the Law Reform Commission's
inability to articulate clearly a distinction between real crime and regulatory offences, one of its
aims. In view of the earlier analysis about the indeterminate nature of liberal rights, note that
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argument seems to be that the private property right, with its associ-
ated rights to deal with one's property as one wishes, itself promotes
the attainment of political freedoms and rights which are worth pro-
tecting through law.3 The argument in its modern capitalistic form is
familiar.
Friedman 2 argues that it is only with capitalism that one gets
freedom.33 He describes how, in early societies, families or small,
closely-knit groups combine to produce for their own needs. Soon it
becomes more efficient to specialize in production and exchange goods
and services with other specializing groups. As each group could pro-
vide for its own needs, its choice to produce only part of what it needs
and to exchange for the remainder, is an exercise of freedom. As more
people behave in this way, then the more self-reliant they are and the
less need there is for government interference. Decentralized, private
decision-making is enhanced; the most efficient use of abilities and re-
sources will develop as private-decision makers, as fully informed as
possible of the availability of resources, goods and services, will demand
and supply to suit their individual needs. This is as true of the com-
modities market as it is of the labour market. The fact that modern
society has developed corporate structures and money is of no concern
to the proponents of this idealized model. Corporations are merely ag-
gregates of individuals making decisions. Money is merely a facilitator
of exchanges. Free exchanges between sovereign, informed individuals
are thus the elements of good society; free enterprise and freedom are
synonymous.34
The importance of this idealized model is its centrality within the
legal system. The Adam Smith/Milton Friedman-type economy it
posits does not require much of a legal system. "All" that is required is
property rights are much more concrete than "freedom", "peace', "liberty", etc. It is thus less
obvious when intrusions on the more abstract rights should be prohibited.
31 This, of course, is an underlying reason why refusing to invest, causing harm to others,
cannot be treated as a crime. I will return to this below. For now, note the devastating critique of
the argument that private property leads to freedom by Cohen, Justice and Capitalism (1981),
126 New Left Rev. 3.
32 Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom (1962), is, surprisingly, one of the very few explicitly
worked out defences of capitalist philosophy found anywhere. By contrast, there are numerous
undocumented assertions of faith.
13 He believes that restraints on movement (as a result of restrictions on the freedom to do
with one's property as one likes) are just as real as overt political restraints - economic freedom
is characterized as no less important and as being of the same nature as political freedom. While
he does not suggest, eventually, that free enterprise is a sufficient condition for political freedom,
Friedman argues that it is a necessary one. See, id. ch. 1.
34 While I will make use of the argument that corporations are really just an aggregate of
individuals and assets, consensus theorists try to reject this notion; see text at note 81, infra.
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that individuals are capable of owning property which they can put to
use. Law has the function of defining what is capable of being owned
and how the boundaries of ownership are to be drawn. In the supply/
demand economy, free, voluntary exchanges must take place. In order
to do that on a continuous basis, the beginning and end of exchanges
must be defined and rules devised to ensure that the will of the ex-
changers is truly expressed. The law of contract thus becomes a signifi-
cant construct of this economic regime. In addition, for this economic
scheme to work, the right to private property must be protected. Those
with property must be safe from coercive interference by others. The
need for a policing system is apparent; a very specific rule for the crim-
inal law is added to what would be its function in a different society:
the protection of physical integrity. Finally, this model of economics
hypothesizes that, if everyone is free to demand and to supply (and is
given perfect information) the most efficient use of resources will ensue.
For this to happen, the exact cost of the goods and services rendered
must be attached to them: this will determine the exact level of demand
for these goods and services, regulate their supply and ensure the ap-
propriate commitment of resources. Frequently, some of the cost of
production will be imposed on persons who do not play a part in a
specific exchange: the neighbourhood which is polluted as a result of
the manufacture of lead batteries (bought by people living elsewhere),
for example. For the economic model, this external cost should be in-
ternalized to the lead battery transaction. The legal system contributes
to this aspect by letting the victims of pollution seek redress from the
polluting activity - the modern law of torts.35 All this is merely to say
that capitalist relations of production require capitalist law. But, in the
search for fundamental social values protected by law, it is easily for-
gotten how deeply embedded in law the basic needs of capital really
are.36 By setting out the obvious, several of the issues raised above can
" See Papandreau, Paternalistic Capitalism (1972) at 14 et seq.
A pedagogue's comment is in order here: To my knowledge, there is not a single common
law law student who is not forced to study property, contract, criminal and tort law (usually in the
first year of law school) no matter how open-ended the curriculum purports to be. (See Consulta-
tive Group on Research and Education in Law, Law and Learning, Report to the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council (1983) at 33 et seq.). The explanation ordinarily offered for
this rare educational unanimity are that these courses are "building blocks" for other subjects.
This is correct, but not in the sense in which it is usually meant. It is not because these courses are
taught in an historical context; often, two hours of history through some case law is its only
semblance - e.g., an hour on the development of assumpsit from debt, plus another on Slade's
Case does it in contracts, references to laissez-faire and its effect on 19th century courts are made
in torts and contracts, although analysis of the philosophy is seldom offered; feudal history is
hinted at through the Statute of Uses and trespass law is given a modern context after 2-4 hours
on 12th and 13th century cases. Nor are these courses peculiarly suited to the teaching of judicial
methodology, which could be equally well taught in, say, labour or trust law. They are building
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now be confronted more clearly.
The economic system to be promoted expects individuals to search
for novel means to use their capacities and resources. They are to be
encouraged to take risks: to venture their assets and their abilities, to
develop new products and new technologies. Inevitably, this will have
some unexpected harmful side-effects which, while regrettable, can
hardly be classified as the outcome of unacceptable behaviour. If his-
tory teaches us that certain kinds of risk-taking are likely to cause
more (or more serious) harm than others, some controls may be im-
posed, but total repression would be inapposite since it would under-
mine the genius and spirit of the free enterprise system. Inasmuch as
the proper costing of risk-taking activity demands this transference of
cost from victims to economic actors, this ought not to attract the re-
pressive power of the State: the appropriate inhibition of the activities
can be left to the cost-transferring system. If the true cost of the activ-
ity, once calculated, increases the cost of the activity greatly, demand
will drop and the activity will stop.
These arguments presuppose a competitive scheme. What, there-
fore, is required is a mechanism to ensure sufficient competition to al-
low these arguments to be supported. The emphasis here is on "suffi-
cient". At any one time there will be "imperfections" in the market
system. This is so because there is uneven development; there are time
lags in the demand/supply exchanges which prevent the Pareto equilib-
rium from being established immediately and remaining continuous;
technological advances by one risk-taker may make it difficult (at least
for a while) for other competitors to mount challenges; the interna-
tional trade situation may put pressure on our market because people
elsewhere do not strive for the competitive perfection we purport to
seek; the model requires perfect information to be available to the eco-
nomic actors so that efficient choices can be made. Given this complex
situation, it is not likely that law-makers will assume that anything but
perfect competition is intolerable and that deviance from this model
must be treated as criminal and forbidden. Rather, the assumption will
be that an indeterminate amount of deviation from perfection will be
tolerated. This "distortion" is mandated by reality. Arguments about
economic efficiency can be made to defend such a dilution of the model.
For example, if a certain firm or plant size is needed to compete inter-
blocks because they lay the foundation for an approach to law which enshrines the raw needs of a
capitalistic economy. For a slightly fuller version of these arguments, see Glasbeek, Menopausal
Musings of a Law Professor (1977), The Advocate 6.
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nationally, 37 competition is not needed on all costs incurred by enter-
prises in order to attain the economic and political objectives to be fur-
thered by a competitive market system; 38 a few large competitors only,
rather than many small ones, may be affordable if technological inno-
vations are to be promoted.39 Thus, some deviance is to be permitted,
or at least treated leniently. Under what circumstances, then, is the use
of criminal law, per se, really warranted in the context of the pursuit of
these social values by means of a market economy?
Conduct which clearly undermines essential components of the
competitive system, no matter how watered down it is, must be con-
strained. Deliberate deceptions which make it impossible for people to
obtain the necessary information to make reasonable choices must be
outlawed. Thus, wilful frauds ought to be treated as crimes. So also
should be the taking of another's private property without authority, by
force or by trickery. Conspiracies wilfully designed to eliminate all
competition could be expected to be perceived as serious crimes. Not
surprisingly, these modes of behaviour are treated as crimes and, when
the evidence is clear, criminal sanctions will be imposed.
In this vein, it could also be expected that not all maiming and
killing of human beings will be subsidized to the full coercive power of
the state. As was noted, such harm may be inflicted as a regrettable
side-effect of risk-takers' market activities. Indeed, Posner - an apos-
tle of free enterprise - argues strenuously how law should dovetail
with market precepts and finds ("Thanks be to heaven!") that it actu-
ally does. He states:
Only the fanatic refuses to trade off lives for property, although the difficulty of
valuing lives is a legitimate reason for weighing them heavily in the balance
when only property values are in the other pan.40
Again, where people claim to have been deceived by a person who was
seeking both to pass on facts and contemporaneously to persuade, it
may be much more problematical to decide if such communications
should be repressed by the use of criminal sanctions. 4' Similarly, in a
'7 See Report of the Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration (The Bryce Commis-
sion) (1978), which made this a central argument in its contention that concentration in Canada
served a useful purpose.
38 Economic Council of Canada, Interim Report on Competition Policy (1969), ch. 2; Bain,
Barriers to New Competition (1956).
" Schumpeter, 3 Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942) at 84 et seq.
"' Posner, The Economics of Justice (1981) at 83-84.
41 Misleading advertising legislation finds it hard to proscribe more than out-and-out lying,
see The Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, ss. 35, 36, 36.1, 36.2. Also see Fitzger-
ald, Misleading Advertising: Prevent or Punish? (1973), 1 Dalhousie L. J. 246.
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system which accepts both "natural" and some induced imperfections,
mere concentration of economic activity, or the reduction of competi-
tion to some of the cost components only, might not obviously call for
that kind of State intervention which we think of as the use of the
criminal law proper. 2 It is not surprising that these modes of behaviour
are not (in fact as opposed to form) made subject to the criminal law in
the sense they are controlled stringently by the State on the basis that
they violate our fundamental mores, threaten our social values and,
therefore, should attract serious penalties for specific and general deter-
rent purposes, as well as deserving stigmatization.
V. REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ECONOMIC BASIS AS EXPLANA-
TORY OF LEGAL SYSTEM AS SUPERSTRUCTURE - RE-
PRISE: THE NEED TO MANUFACTURE A MORAL
JUSTIFICATION
The fact that wrongful corporate activity may cause the same or
worse harm (to individuals, the public, the environment or property) as
does an individual's criminal conduct is not, by itself, sufficient to make
arguments based on evenhandedness of treatment valid. The essence of
the capitalist system does not require that congruence of this kind exist,
that is, that corporate activity should be deemed criminal. The very
relations of production, which it is the law's role to protect and to en-
courage (in particular, behaviour which is consonant with the dominant
mode of production), inhibit such an approach. But neither the law's
functionaries - judges, practicing lawyers, legislators - nor the con-
ventional analysts - liberal academics - accept this characterization
of law. A paradox is created. It is their need to describe the law as a
fully autonomous mechanism, one independent of economic relations,
one which protects fundamental individual rights, which is the genesis
of the controversy regarding the lack of apparent unequal treatment. It
is their ideological myopia which throws up the apparent con-
tradictions.
To solve the problem, these ideologues find it necessary to contend
that there is a moral distinction which justifies the apparent unequal
42 Canadian courts have read the anti-trust legislation to mean that there will be an offence
only when truly very little of a market is outside the sphere of.a restraint agreement or if the
agreement concerns prices rather than other cost items. See Cairns, "Conspiracies in Restraint of
Trade," in Chant et al., eds., Canadian Perspectives in Economics (1972). See also R. v. K. C.
Irving, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 408; R. v. Aetna Ins. Co., [1978] 1 S.C.R. 731.
Although the Combines Investigation Act is criminal in the constitutional sense, as well as in
form, the administrative and judicial approach to it reflects the perception that it is very much like
a road traffic rule; see Goff & Reasons, Corporate Crime in Canada: A Critical Analysis of Anti-
Combines Legislation (1978).
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treatment of harm-creating activity. The distinction used for this pur-
pose is that some of the harm is inflicted with intent, whereas some
(most corporate-induced harm) is not. Thus, injuring in anger is said to
be quite different from injuring someone at work as a result of the use
of a risk-creating process without appropriate safeguards. How logical
is that distinction when the compared injury-causing situations are, on
the one hand a mugging for profit and, on the other hand, a work in-
jury arising from deliberate cost-avoidance? The latter is precisely the
sort of situation which occasionally, very occasionally, causes criminal
prosecutions to be initiated of the same kind as are launched against
the muggers of the world.4" The usual response, however, is not that.
The liberal theorist has difficulties here; the analysis presented herein
does not. The work hazard, an outcome of the very mode of production
being promoted by the law, is seen as a regrettable cost, but merely a
cost, which must be weighed against the benefits of a (relatively) unin-
hibited competitive market system. Mugging, even though done with
the same motivation, is not integral to the idealized free enterprise
model.
To add to the difficulties of the conventional wisdomeers, it is not
even true that the subjective intent of the accused is the moral constitu-
ent which differentiates real crime from other equally harm-causing
conduct. Here I note again the comparison between the drinking driver
and the sober tall-building constructor: it is now apparent that it is
much easier to explain the contrast in treatment by noting that one
activity (the "innocent" one) is the essence of the hallowed mode of
production; the other (the "culpable" one) is only tenuously connected
to such productivity. Divisions drawn on this basis will not always be
dramatic or sharp, but do provide an organizing principle to explain
otherwise unacceptable contradictory trends in the legal system. Here I
return to the unemployment example used earlier. Harm is caused by
wilful conduct. This intentional infliction of injury is not treated as
criminal. The standard, consensus theory explanation is likely to be
that there is no duty on an individual to do anything to help anyone.
43 Normally, prosecutions in respect of work injuries are launched under special legislation,
e.g., The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1978, S.O. 1978, c.83, which imposes ceilings on
fines. Typically, where prosecutions are initiated - a rare occurrence - fines are light. In R. v.
Ontario Gypsum Co. Ltd. (1982), C.C.H. Empt. Safety & Health Guide, para. 95,191, the corpo-
ration was fined $1,500 and a supervisor $500 for a violation which led to the death of a worker.
There is, however, an upward trend as a result of the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Cotton
Felts Ltd. (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 287, where a fine of $12,000 (for a death) was upheld. This has
led to an apparent inflation of fines: see R. v. Inco Limited (No. 3), C.C.H. Empt. Health &
Safety Guide, para. 95,010 (death as a result of a violation) and it was reported in 6 Occupational
Health & Safety Magazine 1, May 1984, that an employer had been fined $10,000 and jailed for
three months.
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This is not absolutely true, vide the parent or guardian who owes such
a duty (under pain of criminal punishment) to care for a ward. 44 In-
deed, there used to be a duty imposed on a master to ensure the safety
and well-being of apprentices and servants. In this context, not to re-
gard workers - dependent on capitalists' investments - as people to
whom a duty is owed, is a deliberate decision. 45 From the point of view
of liberal consensual analysis, it is a sensible decision: it is in harmony
with the legal assumption that capitalists and the workers they hire are
juristic equals. In economic terms this means that they are both equally
free to enter into supply/demand exchanges in the classical sense. In
this light, no duty can be imposed by law on either of the parties, either
to invest or to work; but the symmetry is only apparent. Only the capi-
talists are truly economically free: they have a choice as to whether or
not to invest. The workers have no similar choice: they must sell their
labour. It is this objective fact of economic inequality, as opposed to the
illusion created by juristic equality, which makes the freedom to create
unemployment so offensive.48 If we were truly anxious that a sense of
deep morality guide the instrument which we call law, the harm caused
to the relatively defenceless by the wilful conduct of the powerful
would be treated as unacceptable legal conduct. We do not, according
to liberal theorists, permit the strong to take away the life, liberty and
security of the weak 47 just because they are strong. The deliberate
blindfold liberals wear in the labour relations' situation suggests that
morality, in any deep sense, is not as crucial a factor to them as it is
made out to be.
Another, and simpler way, to explain (in consensual terms) why
refusal to invest, or to continue to invest, is not criminal, is to argue
that capitalists should be free to do with their property as they like.
This is what differentiates them from welfare mothers. This assumes
44 Sections 197, 200 The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
" The former s. 201, repealed by amending Act, 1980-81-82, c. 125, s.14, proclaimed Jan.
1983.
" This is one of McPherson's central points in Elegant Tombstones: A Note on Friedman's
Freedom (1968), 1 Can. J. Pol. Sci. 95, a brilliant critique of libertarianism and the Friedmanite
thesis of the conjunction between free enterprise and freedom. McPherson shows that Friedman
assumes that a family which decides to produce for exchange is directly analagous to a worker for
wages, even though the family could produce its own necessities and, therefore, never had to
exchange, whereas this is clearly not true of the worker.
17 The phraseology is deliberately chosen - it is that of s.7 of the new Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. Protection is to be given to these "rights" provided that they are abstract,
not concrete or, better, economic. The separation of the economic from the political is crucial to a
theoretical scheme which does not want to alter economic power relations through political/legal
intervention. See Glasbeek & Mandel, supra note 28. A fortiori, the wielding of economic power
in a way which affects alleged s. 7 rights is not to be criminalized.
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that ownership of private property is a basic human right which is un-
questionable in our society. But it is simply not true that the law per-
mits people to do as they like with their own property. Creation of ex-
cess noise or noxious fumes on one's own property may be prevented
because it interferes with other people's enjoyment of their property.
Furthermore, in the right circumstances, such abuse by owners of their
own property may well amount to a public nuisance which may be
treated as a crime.48 To overcome this line of reasoning, the consensual
apologist for the non-investing capitalist is forced to argue that there is
an important distinction between commission (causing a nuisance) and
omission (permitting unemployment). In moral philosphy this might be
deemed sophistry. Even in law it is not a very persuasive argument:
after all, deinvestment is commission in that it may require capital to
be taken out.49
In sum, the notion that it is the essence of the act which will char-
acterize it as criminal in the strictest sense is valid. What is not valid is
the suggestion that there is some moral criterion which helps us to dis-
tinguish criminal behaviour from less reprehensible conduct, from con-
duct which can be controlled satisfactorily in other ways, and which
our shared values require us to treat differently. Rather, the rationale
for such different treatment is a seldom articulated belief that some
activities, no matter how harmful and no matter how insensitive to
their effects the actors were, are essential to the capitalist mode of pro-
duction. This belief is embedded in law and is, in turn, generated by
the law's mystification of it. What does all this mean for the study of
corporate crime?
VI. CONSENSUS THEORY AND THE FORM V. SUBSTANCE
PROBLEM
The extent of competition in Canada differs vastly from the ideal-
ized model on which the theoretical arguments are based. It is this
which justifies some legal intervention in investment and production,
whether of the direct or the social type. Through direct regulation, gov-
ernment aims to control prices and the price rate or structure (for ex-
ample, rent, taxi rates, marketing boards), the rate of return (pipelines,
distribution of gas), entry to or exit from economic activity (profes-
48 Section 176, The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34.
It is possible to differentiate, in philosophical terms, between omissions and commissions;
no wizardry is required, however, to turn a characterization of omission into one of commission
and vice versa. See, e.g. R. v. Forgeron (1958), 121 C.C.C. 310 (N.S.C.A.) at 313, per Isley C. J.
and discussion in Glasbeek & Rowland, supra note 1 at 540.
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sions, broadcasting, air transport, public utilities) and output (manage-
ment of energy). Social regulation also controls economic behaviour,
but it affects the conditions under which goods and services are pro-
duced and sold, as well as the physical characteristics of the goods pro-
duced. Thus, workers' health and safety, environmental integrity, accu-
rate product and service information, notions of fairness in hiring
production workers and the treatment of purchasers of produced goods
and services, all form part of the web of social regulation.50
Obviously, each intervention takes place in the context of the as-
sumptions of a market economy. Each legislative provision distorts the
untrammelled market activity. It therefore must be evaluated by crite-
ria such as the free interplay of market actors, optimal conditions for
efficiency, as well as the political or policy objects of the State. In ef-
fect, political decision-making will take place in a setting where cost-
benefit analysis will be a major determinant, sometimes explicitly,
other times implicitly. The controls imposed on market actors will be
perceived as part of an environment in which the adapted ideal of com-
petition is the holy grail. The purpose is to inhibit certain kinds of be-
haviour, but to do so reluctantly: although they cause more harm than
is acceptable, the productive nature of the activities remains, in a gen-
eral sense, most welcome.51 Deviation from a norm (which itself is seen
as a deviation from the ideal) is not, in this ideological setting, so rep-
rehensible as to warrant being called criminal in the same sense as we
think of an activity as unproductive and harmful as, say, sexual assault.
The issue is confounded, however, because the legislative mecha-
nisms used are criminal in form. Their genesis is such that they are a
direct intervention by an external force, the State, with the supposedly
self-regulating interchanges between autonomous individuals. As the
market actors themselves have not agreed to the terms of the imposed
intervention, the terms will not be self-enforcing. Therefore, the inter-
venor, the State, must provide for compliance. Penal sanctions accom-
pany the commands; policing systems have to be set up. In other words,
the legislative schemes are, on their face, indistinguishable from the
criminal law provisions which govern theft, assault, sexual assault and
murder. The only thing which differentiates them is the unseen factor:
5o This listing of regulated activities is taken from the Economic Council of Canada's Re-
sponsible Regulation: An Interim Report (1979).
,1 See text accompanying notes 40-43, supra. Thus it is that, when intervening, the regula-
tors will always consult the would-be regulatees. This leads to the lobbying, alliances between
regulators and regulatees and all those practices so distasteful to liberals. It is this which makes it
unlikely that tough standards will be set, and which maintains the logic of the State having to
prove that it has a right to interfere with private ordering.
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the purposes at which they aim. Although these provisions can be char-
acterized as having objectives such as deterrence, retribution and de-
nunciation - the same general aims of the criminal system - this is
also true of much of the civil law. But, as in the case of civil actions,
the major thrust of these regulatory provisions (in contrast with, say,
the law relating to murder) is to ensure approximation of the competi-
tive enterprise model and to mediate the harsher effects of the market
economy. At the same time as controls are imposed, legitimation is
sought for the productive activities which are perceived as the nub of
the capitalist relations of production. The purpose is assuredly not to
discourage people (especially not corporations who have only capitalist
goals) from enterprising freely (with risk and aggression), whereas it is
the clear purpose of the law to prevent killing for "unproductive"
reasons.
This line of argument goes some way towards explaining the as-
pects of regulation which the liberal capitalist model finds difficult to
rationalize and which particularly trouble the students of corporate
crime who are concerned with the apparent lack of evenhandedness in
the treatment of deviance. I refer here to the much bemoaned fact that
policing of regulatory statutes is lax. The politicians do not provide suf-
ficient funding; 52 inspectors are amiable conciliators more than they are
purposeful enforcers; 53 the standards to be enforced are set with too
much regard for alleged economic efficiency; 54 the administrative agen-
cies have no clear-cut policies, not knowing whether they should pro-
mote capital accumulation (that is, permit profits to be made at some
cost to others) or to legitimate political liberalism by showing that they
are not willing to trade lives for property (or, at least, not weigh lives
very heavily in the scales) .55 If, as this paper argues, the intention be-
hind floor-type and market-ordering legislation is to mediate market
activities, not to attack them, the problems set out above may arise
from the indeterminate nature of the compromises made by the legisla-
tors: there is no commitment to particular levels of welfare or competi-
tion. 56 The functionaries of the ensuing schemes will have little guid-
02 This is all too obvious today when deregulation has become so popular.
53 This is an old problem; see Carson, Some Sociological Aspects of Strict Liability and the
Enforcement of Factory Legislation (1970), 33 Mod. L. Rev. 396; and his White Collar Crime
and the Enforcement of Factory Legislation (1970), 10 Br. J. Crim. 383.
" For work emphasizing that it is not real economic efficiency which governs standard-set-
ting, see Kazis & Grossman, Fear at Work: Job Blackmail, Labor and the Environment (1982).
See also note 42, supra.
"I Barnett, Corporate Capitalism, Corporate Crime (1981), 27 Crime & Delinquency 4.
,6 Id. See also, supra note 42; note that The Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-
23, does not permit limits on competition which unduly or unreasonably restrict competition. The
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ance as to how much control they should exercise over market actors,
but they will be certain that they should not dismantle the competitive
market regime. The form of the regulatory system notwithstanding, the
implicit understanding is that the regulatees' behaviour does not obvi-
ously violate fundamental social values.
Some commentators see this. The Law Reform Commission of Ca-
nada advocated strenuously that certain kinds of behaviour which cause
great harm should be subjected to non-criminal regulation. The basic
argument was that, whatever the harm, the conduct was not such as to
threaten basic social values,5" that it was malum prohibitum rather
than malum in se. The indeterminance of such classification has al-
ready been noted. Bentham, at a much earlier stage, argued that the
purpose of defining an act as criminal, to make it a malum in se was
the unacceptability of the consequences. Similarly, the purpose of for-
bidding certain kinds of conduct, to declare it a malum prohibitum,
was the need to avoid certain kinds of harm. He thought the distinction
merely one of semantics, if not spurious.5 More recently, the Supreme
Court of Canada wrote that it did not find the distinction a very mean-
ingful one and, if it had to be made, the Court supposed, in the absence
of any useful criteria, it would assume that offences already found in
the Criminal Code were true crimes or mala in se, whereas if they
were not, they were offences of a different order, mala prohibita.5 9
Again, in Sault Ste. Marie,60 the same court differentiated between the
kinds of intent needed for various species of offences and ranked "of-
fences which are criminal in the true sense" as requiring proof beyond
reasonable doubt to be shown by the prosecution of the accused's sub-
jective intent to commit the harm-causing act; "public welfare of-
fences", not being truly criminal, imposed a lesser onus in respect of
the intent to be proved. When called upon to distinguish true crimes
from public welfare offences in a subsequent case, the Court held that
true crimes were those found in the Criminal Code, whereas public
welfare offences were not.61 Now the Criminal Code has an enormous
range of offences in it, some of which arguably might not be seen as
room given for manoeuvre is great; neither legislators nor bureaucratic regulators are coerced into
enunciating an ideal mix of competition and collaboration.
" See note 29, supra and the text preceding it.
58 Everett, ed., A Comment on the Commentaries: A Criticism of William Blackstone's
Commentaries on the Laws of England by Jeremy Bentham (1976 reprint of 1928 ed.) at 80 et
seq.
59 R. v. Vasil, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 469, 58 C.C.C. (2d) 97, per Lamer J. at 489-90 (S.C.R.).
60 [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, 121 D.L.R. (3d) 41.
61 R. v. Prue and Baril, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 547, 4 W.N.R. 554.
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proximately related to basic social values (whatever they are).62 The
converse is equally true: some regulatory law offences may be very
closely connected to the protection of basic social values (for instance,
protection of life). A leader in traditional criminal law scholarship has
written:
The so-called quasi-criminal offences are followed by the same procedure for
prosecution and kind of punishment as other offences. All offences are, in a
sense, public welfare offences, and all result from regulation. 3
Unsurprisingly, given this quicksand-like basis for the erection of cate-
gories, the Law Reform Commission of Canada has changed its re-
search focus and has commissioned a series of studies to assess the
value of criminalizing more of what is presently "regulatory", rather
than decriminalizing what is presently "truly criminal".6 4
While it is clear, then, that the form of regulation does not fool
consensus theorists into assuming that, just because an offence takes on
a particular form, a "true crime" has been created, it is also true that
they cannot be sure that this has not been done. This leads them to
search for ways out of their apparent dilemma: why are violators of
seemingly similar offences treated differently, given that there is no
principled means (from within the traditional framework of reference)
by which such offences can be distinguished? That is where we began:
the argument that there is such a thing as corporate crime, as identified
by Sutherland and his successors, rests on the finding that corporations
frequently breach statutory law which is penal in form.
VII. FUDGING THE ISSUE: CONSENSUAL THEORIES AND
ARGUMENTS OF INAPPROPRIATENESS AND IM-
PRACTICALITY
To rationalize away what seems to be distorting leniency when
corporate actors breach law which is penal in form and which is hard
to classify as non-criminal, consensus theorists adopt a series of devices,
none of which are ultimately convincing. The purpose is to explain why
it is acceptable not to treat corporate deviance as corporate crime, even
when the conduct might be criminal in apparently analagous settings.
Initially the argument was made that, if a violation of a regulation
12 The Law Reform Commission of Canada, supra note 23, argued that offences which did
not violate social values should be taken out of the Criminal Code. As examples, they chose plac-
ing bets for consideration, having a motor vehicle equipped with a smokescreen and pretending to
practice witchcraft. But they were ambivalent on unlawful gaming, acts of indecency, incest, etc.
63 Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (1983) at 936.
" Law Reform Commission of Canada, Twelfth Annual Report, 1982-1983 at 22.
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or statute (penal in form).was to be treated as the commission of a
substantive crime, the corporate accused should have all the special
protections an accused person is normally accorded. The corporation is,
therefore, to be presumed innocent until proven guilty and that guilt
required the establishment of a guilty mind. How else could the exer-
cise of State coercive power and the attribution of stigma be justified?
This line of reasoning offered a way out - corporations could not be
made criminally responsible because they did not act, they did not have
a mind capable of guilt. But the concrete use of the corporation as a
central economic actor rendered it impossible to maintain this line of
argument. While there is still no clear theoretical framework to define
and describe the legal personality of a corporation,65 the need to have
corporations which were capable of holding property, of dealing with it,
of entering into contracts and so on, soon made it clear that, whether or
not a conceptually logical whole could be created, the law had to be
able to impose duties and obligations on corporations. In the criminal
law field, this led to the development of the notion that the corporation
could be held criminally responsible if the conduct complained of was
that of its guiding mind and will. This has created a jurisprudential
minefield: who, in law, is to be considered the "guiding mind and will"
of the corporation for these purposes? 6 The consensus argument
quickly alters: given the difficulty of identifying the guiding mind and
will, and its relationship to the harm-creating conduct, criminal law
remains an unwieldy instrument with which to regulate corporate beha-
viour. This is not an argument of principle, dependent as it is on defini-
tions which can be tailored at will and on fact-finding which is quite
subjective.6 7
Another argument, offered as one of principle, is that it is wrong
to punish A to have an effect on B. Apart from the rare occasion where
the guiding mind and will is that of directors who are also sole (or
main) shareholders, the effect of imposing a fine on the corporation is
05 Well-known theories include the fiction theory, the concession theory, the bracket theory
and the realist theory. Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons (1938), 54 L.Q.R. 494, counted
sixteen such theories.
es The literature is voluminous. See, e.g. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Pa-
per 16, Criminal Responsibility for Group Action (1976); Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Cor-
porations in English Law (1969); Leigh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other
Groups (1977), 9 Ott. L. Rev. 247; Welsh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations (1946), 62
L.Q.R. 345; Winn, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations (1929), 3 Camb. L. J. 398.
67 Courts give themselves elastically phrased formulae for decision-making; see R. v. St.
Lawrence Corp. Ltd. (1969), 5 D.L.R. (3d) 236, 3 C.C.C. 263 (Ont. C.A.); Moore v. L Bresler
Ltd., [1944] 2 All E. R. 515 (K.B.); Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v. Nattrass, [1972] A.C. 153,
[1971] 2 W.L.R. 1166 (H.L.); R. v. Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd., [1974] 4 W.W.R. 516, 27
C.R.N.S. 55 (Alta. D.C.).
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to punish "inactive" shareholders. The only purpose of that can be to
cause those shareholders to exercise more control over the chief officers
of the corporation in the future. In large, diffusely-held corporations,
this is likely to be ineffective and, more importantly, it would be wrong
to punish persons only indirectly or totally uninvolved with the con-
demned conduct when the actual perpetrators could be prosecuted
directly. 68
As I argue below, I agree with the view that the actual wrongdoers
should be the ones singled out for penalizing wherever possible, but not
because I accept the arguments which such people as Glanville Wil-
liams make. Note that that part of the reasoning which purports to be
pragmatic - that punishing shareholders will be inefficient because
they do not control directors very much in the usual setting - is based
on an assumed set of facts. Presumably, each case will involve different
circumstances. In fact, as I will show later, in many important cases it
is simply not true that shareholders do not have a sufficiently direct
link with the guiding mind and will of the corporation. 69 As to the sec-
ond point made, it is simply a farrago to pretend that it is unfair to
punish innocent shareholders just because they are connected to the
deviant corporate actor. To presume that they are innocent is to put the
cart before the horse. Even if some will be innocent (in the sense that
they were very distantly connected or had no financial connection with
the corporation at the time of the wrongdoing), it is true that consensus
theorists do not shy away from imposing punishment on the innocent
family members and dependants of wrongdoers who are not corporate
actors. Thus, if a truck driver is imprisoned and loses his licence for
life, are his dependant's losses a bar to the use of criminal law? Are the
potential losses of his creditors - the truck vendor or the mortgagee of
his house - seen as barriers to an argument of principle about the
inapplicability of criminal sanctions to the truck driver's misconduct?
These questions answer themselves. From the consensus theorists' point
of view,70 if there is a difference between the corporate wrongdoer and
the errant truck driver, it is not one of principle but one of quantum.
This leads to another set of arguments raised by defenders of the
status quo. The first is that, even if deviant corporations were to be
treated as true criminals, the task of devising appropriate punishment
would prove intractable. The idea is that, as a corporation cannot be
Williams, supra note 18, at para. 283.
'a See text accompanying note 118 et seq., infra.
70 As will be shown below, the logic of conflict theory allows differential treatment of the
truck driver and his dependents.
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incarcerated, or otherwise corporally punished, the only useful tool is a
fiscal penalty. At first blush this appeals because a corporation is pri-
marily motivated by monetary incentives, but the achievement of the
ordinary goals of punishment will be problematic. This is so because
the fine should, at the very least, be enough to deter corporations from
engaging in such behaviour. This would require fines of a quantum suf-
ficient to wipe out the potential illegal gain, plus something extra.
Moreover, inasmuch as this treats corporations as rational actors, the
fine must be increased to account for the likelihood of the wrongdoer
being caught. Thus, the expected illegal gain should be multiplied by a
factor of ten if the chance of being caught is ten percent, in order to set
the right penalty. If used, this calculus would lead to the imposition of
enormous penalties, frequently in excess of the assets of the deviant
corporation. From here it is but a short step to the argument that fines
are an inappropriate sanction, as their proper assessment and levy
would result in overkill (with, of course, truly undesirable effects on
"innocent" actors). In response, one ingenious proposal has been made
to attenuate the direct effect of properly calculated fines by forcing the
corporation to issue more shares to raise a capital sum equivalent to the
penalty. This equity fine would punish "innocent" shareholders lightly,
permit the corporation to function and have a disciplinary effect on
managers, as well as creating a pool of funds capable of being used
restitutively.71
The reasoning set out in respect of fines is not persuasive if the
message is that corporations should not be criminally punished. Firstly,
it is mildly ironic. One of the major legal attributes of the corporation
is that the investors' personal liability is limited to the extent of their
investment. This notion is relatively recent and, until its rather sudden
acceptance, was seen as unpalatable because, if investors ran little risk
compared to gains to be made by socially evil conduct, it would en-
courage irresponsibility. It was described as a "Rogues' Charter". 2
Limited liability obviously encourages people to invest who do not wish
to be directly responsible for the operation of the enterprise, but this
development worried managers of the enterprise, lest they bear the full
brunt of mishaps of various kinds. The idea that the separate entity,
the legal person who benefitted from the managers' and investors' ac-
tivities, should be made liable for harm done makes sense in this con-
text. An argument that the corporation also is the wrong risk bearer,
71 Coffee, Jr., "'No Soul to Damn, No Body to Kick" An Unscandalized Inquiry into the
Problem of Corporate Punishment (1981), 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386.
72 See Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (4th ed., 1979) at 46-47, n.50.
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because the impact of liability would be disproportionate, thus seems
somewhat perverse. It suggests that a legal construct created to en-
courage risk taking (which implies that when risks materialize there
will be losses) can only be effective if the true risks are not borne by
it.73 Not surprisingly, the strongest adherents of individualistic free en-
terprise do not make these arguments. They must adhere to the view
that corporations are the proper bearers of punishment because they
are actors representing a number of individuals' acts and will, if sanc-
tioned, exert pressure on those individuals to behave better in the
future. 4
It is apposite at this point to note the interplay of these two argu-
ments in practice. It seems to be true that, when fines are imposed on
corporations, they seem to be very light.7 5 In part, this is a consequence
of low ceilings being imposed by regulators; in part, it is a result of the
reasoning of some of the conventional wisdom set out above: fines must
not "break" the corporation - a concept accepted by the judiciary. 6
Given this circumstance, when a corporate deviant and its managers
are prosecuted, it becomes rational for the decision makers in the cor-
poration to have the legal entity bear the light brunt of the penalty
while the managers (often the rational decision makers) escape scot-
free. A frequent occurrence is that there will be a bargain which results
in the corporation pleading guilty and the charges against individual
7' This is a familiar argument during these recessionary times. Bail-outs for large corpora-
tions are necessitated because the cost of letting them and their investors bear the full brunt of
their losses is not to be contemplated. Adam Smith warned that irresponsible management would
result if the investors were not personally responsible for the materialization of risks, see The
Wealth of Nations, (1970) Book III, Ch. 1.
74 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1977).
75 E.g. see figures in note 43, supra; Dershowitz, Note - Increasing Community Control
over Corporate Crime - A Problem in the Law of Sanctions (1961), 71 Yale L.J. 280; Stanbury,
Penalties and Remedies under the Combines Investigation Act 1899-1976 (1976), 14 Osgoode
Hall L.J. 571.
70 In addition, the size of corporate assets may often be incomprehensible to judges used to
dealing with mere human beings. Thus, it was recently reported that the largest fine ever was
imposed on Imperial Oil for cutting off supplies with an anti-competitive motive. Could the court
really have understood that the $75,000 fine was only the equivalent of two hours' profit for the
corporate organization? See Toronto Star, Apr. 25, 1984, E-1. Similarly, in 1961, General Elec-
tric was fined $437,000, which appeared an enormous amount, as did the fine in the Folding
Carton industry conspiracy in which each of 23 conspirators were initially fined $50,000 (some
fines were later reduced). When these fines are compared with a fine imposed on a person earning
$15,000 annually, they worked out to be $12.30 in the G.E. case and from 24 cents to $1.80 in the
Folding Carton one. See Box, supra note 13 at 49; Ermann & Lundman, Corporate and Govern-
mental Deviance: Problems of Organizational Behavior in Contemporary Society (2nd ed., 1982).
This difficulty has led the Law Reform Commission of Canada, Working Papers 5 & 6: Restitu-
tion, Compensation, Fines (1974) to recommend the imposition of day-fines, that is, fines stan-
dardized by reference to the earnings of the offender.
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managers being dropped.77 No doubt this reinforces those who argue
that the imposition of fines is a futile exercise, but this is only true
because their notion that fines are to be relatively light is accepted in
the first place.1 8
The argument - that the impracticality of levying appropriate
fines against corporations makes the use of criminal law a problem -
is peculiar when made by those theorists who do not question the sepa-
rateness of the corporation from its members when it is convenient to
do so, namely when it enhances private capital formation and accumu-
lation. More central to the text of this paper, however, is another cri-
tique which can be mounted against those who use the impracticality of
assessing appropriate fines as a reason for not punishing corporations.
Even if it is conceded, for the sake of argument, that the imposition of
fines is not a useful way to punish corporations, this does not mean that
other criminal sanctions could not be employed successfully and that
criminal law ought not to be used as a regulatory device. While corpo-
rations cannot be corporally punished, they can be de-licensed. That is,
they can be prohibited from engaging in certain, or in all, enterprise.19
This raises another series of practical problems, such as the possibility
that the same persons could form another corporate person to engage in
the prohibited area of activity, but this does not mean that the sanction
may not be effective in some cases. Further, the assets of a corporate
wrongdoer could be expropriated, perhaps for the use of the victims of
deviance, or of the State - something akin to capital punishment. For
those who think this too drastic, other forms of sanctions exist. For
instance: the use of preventive orders, injunctions, probation orders and
the use of publicity. 0 Of course, any or all of these could be combined.
77 See text at note 107 infra, et seq. and see note 43 supra. For a recent example, see R. v.
Simpson-Sears Limited and H. Forth & Co. Ltd., May 13, 1983 (unreported) in which Forth was
convicted, but its major shareholder and guiding mind was not, even though there was no doubt of
his wrongful conduct. His illness and age were cited as reasons, as well as the fact that punish-
ment of the corporation would punish him. See Kastner, Misleading Advertising (1984) (a paper
submitted in partial requirement of the LL.M., available on request). For more spectacular exam-
ples, see the descriptions in Fisse & Braithwaite, The Impact of Publicity on Corporate Offenders
(1983) at ch. 13 & 14, of the Lockheed and McDonnell Douglas bribery cases in which, in return
for dropping charges against major executives directly implicated in wrongdoing, the -corporation
pleaded guilty.
78 In absolute terms they may be large, but often even that is not true.
"' After all, it is a common punishment for human criminals. They are often prohibited from
associating with certain persons or frequenting particular places. Where licences are needed, they
may be revoked: taxi drivers, alcohol sellers, lawyers, etc. Closer to home, a bankrupt is not al-
lowed to enter business again until creditworthiness is again proven and discharge from bank-
ruptcy is deserved.
80 For a review of these possible tools, see Fox, Corporate Sanctions: Scope for a new Selec-
tivism (1982), Melsey L. Rev. 26. Fox has written extensively on the use of publicity by a regulat-
ing mechanism, the views being summarized and analysed in an empirical setting by Fisse &
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Thus, while it is my position that there is, in fact, usually little reward
in punishing the corporation itself, I do not rest the argument on the
basis of impracticality or unfairness as do those who seek to justify the
restricted use of criminal law vis-az-vis corporate deviants.
Another variant of the argument that criminal law is inapposite to
corporate wrongdoing is based on organizational theory. The idea is
that a corporation is an organization and, like all organizations, it has
formal goals. Sociologists argue that the only way to judge an organi-
zation, therefore, is by the measure of its success in the establishment
of these goals. Inevitably, organizations develop internal monitoring
systems to make their personnel conscious of their rate of performance.
As the organization gets larger and more complex, sub-goals are estab-
lished for departments. For those departments' personnel, preoccupied
with their own goals, the central goals of the organization may drop
from view. Difficulties in attaining their particular goals may lead to
aggressive behaviour as the organization's personnel adapt the environ-
ment to facilitate the achievement of their tasks."' The adaptations
sought to be made by corporations often will be legal (for example,
planning strategies, devising stratagems to secure sources of supply and
the level of demand, political lobbying to get favourable trade condi-
tions and regulatory schemes), but often illegal.82 Some studies exist
which show that violations of a particular kind are probable, given the
industrial and financial markets in which a corporation operates. For
example, labour law violations are more likely in the service sector than
they are in the distribution sector, environmental deviance more proba-
ble in manufacturing than in service;83 comparatively little anti-trust
violation is likely to occur in the monopolistic and highly competitive
sectors, relatively more in areas conveniently categorized as being in
the intermediate range of economic concentration, 4 though distributors
and franchisees of monopoly suppliers may be coerced into defrauding
Braithwaite, supra note 77.
81 See, e.g., Blau & Scott, Formal Organization (1962); Ermann & Lundman, supra note
76; Gross, "Organizations as Criminal Actors," in Wilson & Braithwaite, eds., Two Faces of
Deviance (1978) at 199.
82 Clinard & Yeager, supra note 13, at 48 et seq.
" Barnett, supra note 57, at 5-6.
84 Pfeffer & Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Per-
spective (1978); Burton, "An Economic Analysis of Sherman Act Criminal Cases," in Clabault &
Burton, eds., Sherman Act Indictments, 1955-65: A Legal and Economic Analysis (1966); Riedel,
Corporate Crime & Interfirm Organization: A study of Penalized Sherman Act Violations
(1968), 8 Grad. Soe'y Club J. 74. For a differing view, see Hay & Kelley, An Empirical Survey
of Price-Fixing Conspiracies (1974), 17 J. Law & Econ. 13.
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customers.85 This kind of analysis suggests that the fact of organization
is a significant reason for deviance. The equivalents of conventional
bonds, strain, anomie, labelling and other such theories are thus found.
Moreover, given the overall setting which leads to wrongful behaviour,
it may be hard to pinpoint actual human wrongdoers. This will be so
because work and tasks will be broken down and discretion limited.
Refined theories of organization have evolved to show how different or-
ganizational forms lead to varying degrees of individual autonomy in
decision-making, and how the issue will be complicated because in any
one organization diverse kinds of organizational principles may co-ex-
ist.86 All of this becomes fodder for the argument that the imposition of
criminal sanctions on the organization's personnel may be impractical,
even unfair, and that it would be just as inapposite to apply criminal
law to the organization itself, as this would not lead to better behaviour
in general, deviance being intrinsic to the organizational form. Hence,
another scheme of reform has come to the fore. The best variant is
presented by Christopher Stone. His idea is that corporations should be
restructured so that particular, identifiable individuals would be respon-
sible for making the corporation socially conscious and responsible. The
purpose, of course, is to overcome the innate criminogenic nature of the
corporation.87 There are obvious difficulties with this kind of proposal.
For the moment, however, the point is that it arises logically from a
theory which justifies treating deviant corporations differently from
human deviants, that is, as non-criminals. Is the theory viable?
The first point to note is that, in the corporate organizational set-
ting, the theory is over-inclusive. There will be many situations in
which individuals can exercise choice. While it is true that in some
circumstances it may be difficult to discern who caused the smoking
gun to be fired, it will not always be impossible. Moreover, personnel
with real discretion might very well be characterized as guiding minds
of the corporation. 8 Note that there is some evidence that decision-
makers in corporations often become so because they are willing to pro-
mote the needs of the corporation, even when this means abandoning
85 Leonard & Weber, Automakers and Dealers: A Study of Criminogenic Market Forces
(1969-70), 4 Law & Soe'y Rev. 407.
88 Note, Decisionmaking Models and the Control of Corporate Crime (1976), 85 Yale L. J.
1091.
87 Stone, Where the Law Ends: The Social Control of Corporate Behavior (1975).
8 See e.g., R. v. Waterloo Mercury Sales Ltd., supra note 67, and the argument in the text
in respect of the scope for judicial discretion in this matter. Refer also to the Lockheed, McDon-
nell Douglas kinds of situations referred to in note 77, and to the Amway case discussed in the
text at note 110, infra.
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some of the ideals which they hold as private citizens. Larger corpora-
tions, by encouraging conformity and identification with their goals,
cause normal community bonds to be loosened. Unswerving loyalty to
such goals is rewarded. Moreover, the more ambitious and shrewder
persons - who perceive this and are promoted through the ranks to
positions of responsibility - are helped in their socialization by initia-
tion processes which weaken their ties with external groups. An "in-
group" atmosphere is created by a variety of carefully designed means:
overwork, frequent transfers (which inhibit the development of local
community links of lasting nature), internally generated provisions for
leisure and recreation, membership in special clubs. This is a self-per-
petuating scheme, as those who reach the top of the organizational tree
become charged with finding new managers and inexorably select per-
sonnel who are best suited to follow the route they themselves took to
ascend the ladder." In the end, as Gross argues:
[T]he men at the top of the organizations will tend to be ambitious, shrewd and
possessed of a non-demanding moral code ... being at or near the top, these
persons are the most strongly identified with the goals of the organization ... if
the organization must engage in illegal activities to attain its goals, men with a
non-demanding moral code will have the least compunctions about engaging in
such behaviour."°
I would assert that this understanding of managerial development and
personality accords much more with popular public perception than
does one which purports that managers have no control over their lives,
that they do what they must, that they have neither sufficient opera-
tional discretion nor independence of mind to be held criminally re-
sponsible. Indeed, the Stone-type structural changes, which would su-
perimpose a managerial level of decision-makers unable to pass the
buck, are not only a response to the tenets of organizational theory as
such, but are also an implicit recognition that senior executive officers
are not likely to have the kind of moral sensibilities that would make
them responsive to the educative effect of criminal law. There is, argua-
bly, an organizational need for amoral, if not immoral, decision-mak-
ers; to overcome this aspect of organizational logic, the appointment of
persons who are not corporation types makes sense. Only they are
likely to have the right kind of sensitivity for the mores of the external
89 Drucker, Concept of the Corporation (rev. ed., 1972); Madden, "Forces Which Influence
Ethical Behavior" in Walton, ed., The Ethics of Corporate Conduct (1977); Margolis, The Man-
agers: Corporate Life in America (1979); Henning, "Corporate Social Responsibility: Shell Game
for the Seventies?" in Nader & Green, eds., Corporate Power in America (1973).
90 Gross, "Organizational Sources of Crime: A Theoretical Perspective," in Denzin, ed.,
Studies in Symbolic Interaction (1978) at 71.
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community."' In sum, it is a little crude to generalize from the sociol-
ogy of organizational theory and the rich variety of corporate struc-
tures to conclude that it is simply too difficult to identify individual
deviants in corporations and, in particular, individuals for whose intent
and conduct the corporation can be held legally responsible.
More importantly, applying organizational theory arguments to
corporations, without more, is itself over-inclusive. To treat corpora-
tions as if they were not crucially different from other kinds of organi-
zations is an error. As Burawoy has noted, by doing this:
[T]he distinctiveness of the profit-seeking capitalist enterprise is lost . . . being
unreflective about its roots in capitalist society, organization analysis loses this
truth by projecting it into general theories that conceal the historical by specific
features of capitalist and, in particular, advanced capitalist society.9 2
For the purpose of this paper, the specific differentiating feature of the
corporation is that its formal goals - the accumulation of capital,
profit making and the need to reproduce the capitalist relations which
make these things possible - can be readily identified and remain con-
stant. It is sometimes argued that corporate managers are more inter-
ested in stable growth and diversification so that they can increase their
own personal empires and prestige, rather than in maximizing profits, 93
but even where this is so, the ultimate objectives remain the accumula-
tion and profit-making functions. 4 In this context deviance, which is
said to be caused by attempts to adapt the environment to the needs of
the organization, arises from attempts to achieve the formal goals and
the associated sub-goals of the corporate organization.
Other kinds of organizations, however, engage in deviance because
their real goals can only be achieved by illegal means. For example, the
formal goals of a police force - keeping the peace, looking after law
and order - can be achieved by lawful means. If deviance is engaged
91 Thus, 4 of 7 senior managers believed that their cohorts would violate codes (ethical and
legal) if they thought they would not be caught (Baumhart, How Ethical are Businessmen?
(1961), 39 Harv. Bus. Rev. 6), although most did not think they themselves behaved like that (at
10); on the other hand, Brenner & Molander, Is the Ethics of Business Changing? (1977), 55
Harv. Bus. Rev. 57, reported that 4 of 5 executives knew of the existence of unethical practices.
This self-perception speaks volumes about the pressures to ignore external community standards.
Stone himself speaks of this phenomenon as the culture of the corporation (supra note 87, at 236-
37). It is not difficult, then, to see why he insists on non-corporate types having the obligation to
balance profits against such social desiderata as a decent environment, job security, etc. (supra
note 87, at 137-38). Corporate loyalists, trained and steeped in the corporate image, are unlikely
to meet such challenges. A major flaw in Stone's proposal is that it is hard to see how anyone
could, given the inherent conflict between, say, raising prices and causing inflation.
92 Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent; Changes in the Labour Process under Monopoly Capi-
talism (1969) at 5-6.
93 The chief proponent of this view is Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1969).
9 See Box, supra note 13.
[VOL. 22, No. 3
Corporate Deviance
in because of attempts by personnel to meet performance standards
generated by those goals, regardless of means, the situation would be
like that applicable to the corporate organization. But, if the deviance
results because the real goals of the organization have, in fact, become
illegal goals, such as the granting of protection to lawbreakers in return
for money or political advantage, the wrongdoing comes to be built into
the organizational structure for quite different reasons. This substitu-
tion of illegal real goals for legitimate formal ones is frequently the
deviance problem in non-profit organizations.95 Inasmuch as there is
congruence between such organizational deviance and corporate wrong-
doing, it exists because the illicit goals of one organization and its
members (say, the police) are the same as the lawful purpose of the
corporation and its members - making money. This raises the possibil-
ity that the real problem is not the fact of organization but that of
organizing for profit purposes. This is an argument which I find em-
pathic, but it certainly is not the argument which organizational theo-
rists want to make. They pin their faith on the notion that organiza-
tions, no matter what their goals, are inherently deviant. But any
theory which seeks to explain wrongdoing on a structural basis, and
formulates proposals for reform on that basis, should take into account
the specific position of the organizational structure in the total social
context. It is, to say the least, somewhat peculiar to accept that capital-
ist productive activities are central to the Canadian political economy
and then to argue that the most important legal institution created to
further such productive activity is, in essence, no different from organi-
zations which exist for relatively peripheral reasons.
" This argument arises from the analysis offered by Sherman, "Deviant Organization," in
Ermann & Lundman, supra note 76 at ch. 3. Sherman draws a distinction between deviant goals
and deviant means as the sources of organizational deviance. This provided the idea of how to
distinguish (as Buirawoy insists must be done): organizations v. profit-corporate-organizations. The
police develop deviant goals because, by doing so, they can sell what a particular clientele wants to
buy (e.g. protection). Thus, it is the environment which causes the organization to adapt, rather
than the organization manipulating the environment. The latter is the use of deviant means. Typi-
cally, this is what corporations do. Other deviant organizations, such as the police, help a sector of
the environment break the law, rather than breaking the law at the expense of that sector. This is
illustrated neatly by the Knapp Commission, "Police Corruption in New York," in Ermann &
Lundman, supra note 76, at ch. 8. When a police department seeks to achieve its formal goals
illegally - e.g. by beating suspects to get confessions - it behaves like a corporate deviant.
Classically, this is not the organizational deviance seen as inherent. Thus, when there is a real
analogy to be made, it is not used to establish the theory.
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VIII. CONFLICT THEORY: THE APPARENT LACK OF
EVENHANDEDNESS AS AN EXPECTED RESULT; AS
AN OBJECTIVE
It may be useful to review the argument made so far because of
the rather complicated manner of its presentation.
Consensual theorists' reliance upon a shared morality system cre-
ates difficulties for them, as the indeterminate nature of the consensus
does not adequately explain the failure of the differential application of
criminal law. Further, they are obliged to reject economics as a prime
determinant of the legal system as this would deny the independence of
law and the postulates of inherent human values which transcend the
political-economic systems. In addition, the particular idealized eco-
nomic model to which law may be referable in the liberal legal system
is demonstrably non-existent and unbelievable. Finally, when they
reach for arguments based on practicality and the sociology of organi-
zation, these prove to be unconvincing at best and, on occasion, tenden-
tious. All of this contrasts markedly with the logic of the adherents of
conflict theory, in particular the Marxist version of this approach.
There are many varieties of conflict theory. Broadly, they assume
that power is pre-eminent as an explanation of criminal law, rather
than social, economic, psychological or biological conditions." In the
Marxist version, power differentials are seen to be rooted in class divi-
sions. Marxist conflict theory postulates that the major cause of so-
called criminal behaviour is class division which leads to class struggle.
The State is provided with a coercive power to repress the class strug-
gle in favour of the ruling class. In capitalist economies, criminal law
serves the interests of the ruling class by reducing the strains inherent
in the capitalist mode of production. Acts are defined as criminal when
it suits the ruling class to have them repressed. In a capitalist State,
this means that workers and would-be workers are more likely to be
labelled criminal; the bourgeoisie's dominant influence within the State
leads to an erection of a protective shield which, to a large extent, im-
munizes it from the force of the criminal law.97 This does not mean
that criminal law cannot be applied against the wealth-owning class's
wrongful conduct. On the contrary, one of the strengths of liberal capi-
" For a very good account of the various strains of conflict and consensus theories, see Mc-
Donald, The Sociology of Law and Order (1976).
97 See Chambliss & Mankoff, Whose Law, What Order? - A Conflict Approach to Criminol-
ogy (1976), for a straightforward presentation of the basic difference between consensus/func-
tional theories and conflict theories, in particular the two extremes on the spectrum: Durkheim
and Marx.
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talist law is that it purports to cover every member of society. This is,
after all, the genesis of the difficulties discussed in this paper. The class
conflict theorists argue that the theoretical universality of a criminal
law regime based on notions of a shared consensus is at the centre of
the means by which the ruling class seeks to achieve its objective: to
reduce the contradictory strains that arise from class struggle. Portray-
ing coercive State law as emanating from a shared consensus, workers
and would-be workers are trapped into thinking that their interests and
those of the ruling class are the same. It will be necessary occasionally,
therefore, to subject members of the ruling class to the force of crimi-
nal law.
In his path-breaking work, Foucault contends that criminal law is
a system that determines which citizens need to be disciplined so the
ruling class can do as the logic of its perpetuation requires. It will be
able to count on the criminal law, despite the availability of potentially
democratic institutions, so that other sections of the citizenry will ac-
cept their subordinate roles in the integrated system which is the
power-polarized society. For this reason, some violators of law will be
treated harshly, others leniently. The former need to be disciplined, to
be warned that they must accept the order of things, whilst the latter
need no such education.98 Melossi and Pavarini have sharpened this
argument by adapting it to the industrial context. In their hands, con-
flict theory clearly becomes an aspect of class struggle, whereas Fou-
cault addresses conflict in any settings where there are differentials of
power. They argue that prisons are, in fact, factories in which the prod-
uct is a disciplined work force which will accommodate itself to the
needs of the private sphere of production. Thus, while anyone may be
criminally prosecuted for breaking penal law, the fact that punishments
can be dovetailed with the criminal's willingness and capacity to com-
ply with the status quo of productive relations permits dramatic differ-
entiation in treatment of convicted persons. Therefore, while the law
can be perceived to apply to one and all, enhancing its claim to univer-
sality and mirror-like reflection of a shared consensus, it can be applied
with varying force and vigour to different classes in society.9 My col-
league, Michael Mandel, has given this class-based theory empirical
support. He has demonstrated that the population of prisons consists
overwhelmingly of poor, unemployed or underemployed people. Sen-
tencing and (to a greater extent) the parole system consider seriously
11 Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977) esp. at 272-77.
99 Melossi & Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory Origins of the Penitentiary System,
trans. Cousin (1981).
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the convicted person's prior employment record and future employment
prospects. It does not matter how grave the crime is, the sentence will
be lighter, the release earlier, if the accused has a stable work rec-
ord.100 Wealthy people and, of course, corporations, need the least
amount of discipline. Thus, while the criminal law system takes all vio-
lations of all rules seriously, it has a need to punish, or to punish se-
verely, only certain classes of people.1"'
This theory explains as rational and as to be expected the very
results that appear aberrant and problematic to consensus theorists.
Analytically, a theory that actually explains what happens as it hap-
pens is far more convincing than one that can only explain by distin-
guishing between often indistinguishable situations and by appeals to
concepts for which there is no empirical or logical foundation. This is
done by the consensualists when they assert a shared morality, when
they raise technical and procedural barriers as if they were issues of
principle, or when they refer to sociological theory without drawing dis-
tinctions that beg to be drawn, as is the case when consensus theorists
rely on the organizational theories' arguments set out earlier. There-
fore, the conflict approach is, in its class form, the one which I believe
to be the most valid. This, of course, answers the questions which I
raised at the beginning of this paper: Why is the criminal law so sel-
dom used against corporate wrongdoers and why is there no seeming
willingness to so use it in the future? The answer now is that criminal
law is not meant to be so used. This poses a new question: Is there any
point in urging its use, or should the matter be left as a titillating aca-
demic problem for those who seek to justify the existing situation be-
cause to them it poses an intractable, even an ugly, problem. I think it
valuable to use the application of criminal law to corporate wrongdoing
precisely because it is my understanding that it is not intended to be so
employed.
10 Mandel, Democracy. Class and Canadian Sentencing Law (1984), 21-22 Crime & Soc.
Justice 163; Democracy, Class and the National Parole Board (1984) (unpublished, available on
request).
1"I This, in part, explains the form v. substance problem. Whereas violation of rules must be
repressed, where class conflict is not an issue (as in traffic violations), light punishment ensures
roughly equal treatment; where one class does the harm (as in, say, occupational health), it is
useful to classify the rules as non-criminal in nature; where the other class does most of the harm
(as in so-called street crime), it is useful to classify the rules as truly criminal, attracting poten-
tially severe penalties. This explains, at least partially, the fierce resistance to characterizing
breaches of occupational health rules as, say, criminal negligence ones, since this would require
treating people who do not "need" discipline as severely as if they should be educated in this way.
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IX. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF CORPORATE WRONG-
DOING: A CHALLENGE TO CONSENSUAL THEORIES
Rowland and I observed that, technically, criminal law proper
could be used in many situations where the only regulatory mechanism
thought to be applicable is civil or administrative in nature. We hoped
that the use of criminal prosecutions would stigmatize employers' con-
duct and that this would stimulate them, as well as regulators and poli-
ticians, to seek more stringent protection for workers.102 It is the stig-
matization of behaviour that makes it possible to question its general
utility and acceptability. 10 3 In this paper, I have shown that such stig-
matization is not likely to occur because it is not meant to occur, but
that this is not the way this failure to criminalize corporate behaviour
will be explained. Rather, the argument will be that the conduct does
not deserve such treatment or that it would serve no practical purpose.
If this could be shown to be wrong, failure to prosecute and convict
systematically would demonstrate:
i) the deficiency of consensus theories;
ii) the inherent tolerance for harm-causing conduct when it is
closely related to private profit-making; and, associatedly,
iii) the willingness of the legal system to permit the relatively
powerless to be harmed because of their class position.
Certainly, this would be academically useful. It may even be politically
significant. What has to be done is to urge the use of criminal law
where there is little question that the conduct of the corporation and its
agents was akin to that which we normally agree is immoral, that is,
committed with an intent to harm personal integrity or property rights
or, at least, with careless disregard and contempt for the physical integ-
rity or property rights of others. Such situations are not hard to find.
Consider these examples: harm in the workplace because of knowing
non-adherence to established safety standards; deceptive advertising
102 Supra note 1, at 589 et seq.
103 The best example in recent times is the Ford Pinto case. It was not until Ford was prose-
cuted criminally that the issue became a serious problem for the corporation and, more impor-
tantly, for the public at large. Moreover, it has been shown that when the media began to talk of
criminality, public sentiment against the corporation increased and political and regulatory activ-
ity heightened. See Swigert & Farrell, Corporate Homicide: Definitional Processes in the Crea-
tion of Deviance (1980-81), 15 Law & Soc. Rev. 151. That the corporation saw the stigmatization
of a criminal prosecution as serious can be gauged from the massive effort it put into its defence,
one which vastly outweighed its legal resistance to civil law suits and regulatory actions. That
other corporations saw that criminal conviction could lead the general public, its politicians and
regulators, to question their operations can be gauged from the fact that Ford Motor Co. was
congratulated publicly by its competitor, General Motors, when it was acquitted. See The Pinto
Papers in Fisse & Braithwaite, supra note 77, at ch. 4.
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causing prejudicial investments; non-compliance with existing pollution
control orders; conscious entry into resale price maintenance agree-
ments or deliberate predatory pricing techniques. All of these are, in
conventional moral terms, not to be differentiated from behaviour that
consensus theories have no difficulty in calling criminal, such as physi-
cal assault, obtaining by false pretences, public nuisance or mischief,
fraud and theft. The second step, then, is to make it difficult to mount
an argument that, in these cases, criminal prosecution would serve no
purpose. What follows is a series of proposals that may help to attain
this goal.
1. One of the major arguments against punishing the corporation
as such is that fines are usually inadequate to achieve standard crimi-
nal law objectives and, if sought to be made, they will break the corpo-
ration, negating the purpose of the exercise. I agree that it is not very
productive to fine the corporation as such, but, as indicated earlier, not
for these so-called pragmatic reasons. A better argument is that the
corporation does not exist for its own sake and that it should not be
punished unless this makes available the means to get at those who
profit directly from its existence - the flesh and blood accumulators
and controllers of capital. After all, if the corporation is punished, it
does not necessarily follow that those who profited from its wrongful
behaviour will be adequately punished or will not err in the future,
perhaps even in a new corporate guise. In some situations, there will be
this trickle-down effect, but it cannot be counted on. The logic of this
argument requires the imposition of punishment which overcomes this
practical problem of applying ordinary sanctions. I offer the following.
A corporation should only be convicted and punished if some of its
members are also convicted and punished as individuals. This would
ensure both that the trickle-down effect could operate by affecting cor-
porate capital (and thus the profits of voting members and officers of
the corporation) and by subjugating obviously responsible people di-
rectly to the rigours of criminal law. Inasmuch as the latter occurs,
Braithwaite and Geis have shown that the educational effect of such
punishment is likely to be greater than it is in the case of street
criminals. The executive suite criminals have conventional bonds of
great importance, prestige to protect and are unlikely to learn bad hab-
its from their peers when languishing in gaol.1°4
It will have been noted that the suggestion is that there should be
no "either/or" premise. It is crucial that the corporation should not be
104 Braithwaite & Geis, On Theory and Action for Corporate Crime Control (1982), 28
Crime & Delinquency 292.
[VOL, 22, No. 3
1984] Corporate Deviance
prosecuted and convicted if individuals are not. One reason for this has
already been given: the mythology of the corporation being an individ-
ual in its own right should be attacked.10 5 More importantly, as has
been pointed out above, it is precisely the combination of relatively0 8
low fines and the ineffectuality of the hoped-for trickle-down phenome-
non which makes it impractical to use criminal sanctions against corpo-
rations. It is routine for corporations to plead guilty in return for clem-
ency for individuals who may have participated in the culpable conduct
as corporate members. 7 The recent Amway Corporation case illus-
trates this point neatly. A fine of $25,000,000108 was imposed when the
corporation pleaded guilty to having practised a conscious fraud on Ca-
nadian customs laws. The two main directors of the corporation were,
as a result, not prosecuted. The court, in accepting the plea, left no
doubt that it attributed criminal blame to the directors:
The two men involved, Mr. Humphrey has given, as I would expect, his usual
very excellent presentation in mitigation, that these are men who are very re-
sponsible citizens in the United States. Well they weren't very responsible corpo-
rate directors in Canada.
I have some difficulty in accepting that these sophisticated frauds are the respon-
sibility of Mr. Discher or the lawyer who was advising them. The directing minds
of these two corporations involved many others in their web of deception: the
shell companies, the dummy invoices, the false price lists and the fraudulent oral
and written representations and the cross-checking operations, were all part of a
modus operandi by which the scheme functioned and could only have led to the
corruption of employees who were necessarily implicated in furthering the opera-
tion of these frauds.109
To further emphasize how important it is not to let the corporate form
105 In addition to the earlier argument, note that treating the corporation as an individual is
one of the mechanisms by which the legal system removes class arguments from the adjudicative
system. The wealth of the aggregation which is the corporation is ignored in its contests with
individual human beings. More important is the fact that, by reifying the corporation, it is given
human rights such as freedom of speech. It permits political participation by economic organiza-
tions which have access to much greater funds than do individual political actors; it also enhances
anti-democratic practices because the individual corporation represents the views of the minority
of its shareholders, as "democracy" in corporations is still of the one dollar-one vote variety.
108 Supra note 76.
107 Supra note 77.
10I R. v. Amway Corporation and Amway of Canada Ltd. (unreported, Nov. 10, 1983, Ont.
S.C.). The accused had been charged with benefiting to the tune of $28 million from their fraud.
The fine does not stand alone - the Canadian government will be able to levy the actual duty
which should have been paid and could seek to have an administrative fine levied as well. None-
theless, despite its absolute size, the fine was relatively light. McLeans, Nov. 21, 1983 at 44-45,
reported Amway as being a $1.2 billion firm; Time, Nov. 29, 1982, at 54-55, reported that
Amway's annual sales were $1.5 billion. Amway's counsel, on learning the amount of the fine,
responded: "Thank you, my Lord, I am in a position to pay that to-day." (Judgment transcript at
12).
.". Id. at page 11 of judgment transcript.
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obscure the fact that there are real people who act wrongfully and ben-
efit from errant behaviour, note that the two directors concerned were
principal owners of the corporation and had built vast fortunes. For-
tune listed them amongst the four richest Americans, being worth be-
tween $300 and $500 million each. So much for the trickle-down ef-
fect.110 While this is a dramatic example, the point it permits to be
made is of general application.
2. In some situations, however, corporate wrongdoing may not be
attributable to what the law characterizes as a guiding mind. Setting
aside, for the sake of argument, that that definition is elastic and can
be made to fit many more circumstances than it presently does without
offending legal principle,11" ' it may still be possible to identify some in-
dividuals who acted criminally. Every breach of a legal proscription
requires the doing of an act by one or more persons. There is no reason
that they should not be prosecuted as individuals. This may have the
desired effect of deterring them and others. Inasmuch as these miscre-
ants are in inferior positions in the corporate hierarchy, this may be
unfortunate. If an argument is raised which suggests this is unfair be-
cause the accused may have been coerced into the commission of
wrongs, with no hope of personal gain (other than security and ad-
vancement in the corporation!), the individual's position is not morally
different from that of many people convicted as property offenders.
Further, if this is a serious objection, it ought to inspire investigative
forces to look thoroughly for decision-makers with discretion, and to
lay their prosecutions accordingly. Moreover, if the tenets of deterrence
attributed to criminal law make the sense which conventional wisdom
assumes, when it becomes known that those who actually commit
wrongful acts will be punished, the result will be a lower level of corpo-
rate agents having a real stake in setting up lines of communication
within the corporation to identify the responsibility for decision-
making."12
The counter-argument is that this will create corporate scapegoats
110 As reported in The Washington Post, Jan. 22, 1984, at Al, "Cleaning up 'Amway Event'
for Reagan." The story concerned a public venture, originally to be run by Amway, but subse-
quently changed to a public venture organized by local political and business groups so that Presi-
dent Reagan could attend despite Amway's recent conviction. Amway paid the costs of the meet-
ing, and Mr. Reagan was joined on the podium by the two directors who had been castigated but
not prosecuted. Amway has since hired General Haig, a former Secretary of State, as consultant;
see Globe & Mail Dec. 9, 1983. These data were gathered by Hunt, Amway: A Study in Corpo-
rate Criminality and Criminal Justice System Response (1984), a paper towards the L.L.M.
degree in Criminal Law, available on request.
1 See notes 67 and 90, supra.
112 This is the trickle-up theory - one way to tackle the need to restructure the corporation
so that decision makers become visible.
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and that middle management and subordinate personnel will be victim-
ized, while senior officers will be blithely permitted to go on as before,
enlarging the coffers of the corporation with ill-gotten gains. This is not
a contention which should defeat the proposal. It signifies merely that,
in some cases, an additional mechanism must be found to bring the
right people to account. Certainly, there are many large corporations
which have senior executive officers who can be identified as the actual
wrongdoers, as in the Amway case."' In any event, the corporate world
is made up not only of giants. There is an enormous number of middle-
sized and truly small corporations in which the senior officers and ac-
tive personnel are very closely connected - indeed, they are often the
same persons. The suggested approach should be fully effective in these
situations.
3. Even in those circumstances where the senior officers of the cor-
poration are truly removed from the departments and the many sub-
departments which commit wrongful acts while pursuing relatively nar-
row and immediate goals, there is a plausible line of reasoning which
would permit the prosecution and conviction of such senior officers for
wrongful conduct. This arises from the recent revelations of the earn-
ings of some chief executive officers in those very kinds of corporations.
The general public has been agog at the numbers, ranging as they do
from salaries of one half to thirteen million dollars per year. 14 The
business community takes a more matter-of-fact approach: the dollar
amounts by themselves mean little. Rather, the issue is whether or not
the rate of increase or decrease bears any relation to the economic per-
formance, particularly the market-share performance, of the corpora-
tion.11 5 Now, if chief executive officers are permitted to claim that they
contribute to the overall performance of the corporation because they
control its operations, there is no obvious reason why they should not be
held responsible for its daily operations.
I concede that contributing through policy development is not the
same as supervising ongoing function and, therefore, the step in the
argument may be too big to take, but this is an empirical question. For
instance, if a large portion of profits is derived from wrongful con-
duct,1 6 or if the corporation is a frequent violator of legal standards , 7
"I See R. v. McNamara et al. (No. 1) (1981), 56 C.C.C. (2d) 516 (Ont. C.A.), and cases
like the bribery ones, supra note 77.
211 See Business Week, May 7, 1984; Toronto Star, June 3, 1984, at B1; New York Times,
May 2, 1984 at Pl.
11 Business Week, id.
11 As in Amway, supra note 108, or in McNamara, supra note 113, or any case where
hoped-for profits from wrongdoing were large (e.g. R. v. Canadian Professional Golfers' Associa-
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why should a chief executive officer who is credited (with money as
well as prestige) for being prescient, be presumed unaware of this pro-
pensity of the organization for deviance? Thus, while the argument is
not automatically applicable, there are no impenetrable legal or moral
obstacles to its use. Where it is so used, it should most ably meet the
needs of standard criminal law precepts, as well as attract attention to
the fact that the corporation is a device which is used by individuals for
their advantage, not the reverse.
4. More directly, where a corporation is truly large, differentiated
in functions and segmented in its division of labour, there may be sense
in the argument that it is inconceivable for senior officers to be deemed
to have had the necessary criminal intent and that it would be pointless
to punish mere replaceable cogs in the ever-spinning corporate wheel.
However, there is another way to get at major, individual actors. Im-
portant shareholders could be, and should be, held personally responsi-
ble for corporate wrongdoing. This suggestion directly confronts the
proposition that, because some shareholders may be innocent, none
should be prosecuted. Shareholders benefit from unredressed corporate
wrongdoing, whether or not they took an active part, whether or not
they were conscious of the illicit behaviour. But this is not the basis of
the proposition. A narrower group of shareholders may be isolated:
those who have a controlling interest in the affairs of the corporation.
The idea that controlling shareholders should be identified does
not present legal or conceptual problems. It is done every day when
protection is sought for the investor class. Thus, the purpose of the Se-
curities Acts is to ensure that shareholders with more clout than others
will not use their holdings and any associated knowledge to their own
advantage and to the detriment of the corporation and other sharehold-
tion (1980), B.C.D. Crim. Sent. 7140-41; R. v. Browning Arms Co. of Can. Ltd. (1974), 15
C.P.R. (2d) 97 (Ont. C.A.); Stanbury, supra note 75, refers to several cases where the illegal
behaviour netted profits well in excess of the penalties imposed and in which it would have been
necessary for senior personnel to make deliberate decisions.
217 In his work, Sutherland relied a great deal on corporate recidivism to prove his case; see
Sutherland & Cressy, Criminology (9th ed., 1974) at 41. Corporations violated statutes of varying
kinds, which means that senior executive did not necessarily know that the corporation as a whole
was criminogenic. Yet there might be cases, especially if the penalties were significant, where this
might come to their attention. Further, in some cases, the conviction for violations will demon-
strate a long history of wrongful behaviour; see Stanbury, supra notes 75, 116. This makes it less
plausible that senior executives could claim that the matter was not, and should not have been, the
focus of their attention. In addition, before charges are laid, there has frequently been longstand-
ing public agitation about alleged corporate behaviour and its injury-causing nature, e.g. acid rain
as a result of Inco's conduct; asbestosis as a result of Johns-Manville's mode of production. In
such situations, officers who want to be praised for their managerial oversight and insight should
not feel aggrieved if they are blamed for not taking an interest in these issues; see the moving
appeal by Judge Miles W. Lord to corporate executives in just such a situation, reprinted
Harper's, June, 1984, at 13.
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ers. Insider trading is regulated by subjecting persons with a prescribed
amount of equity to certain rules. Similarly, the buying and selling of
shares by shareholders is of no particular interest until a major share-
holder does it, and then the distribution of shares is subjected to con-
trols, since a danger to be contained may arise when the person making
the trade owns a certain amount of the corporation's equity. Sharehold-
ers' interest9 are to be protected when takeovers and mergers occur; the
protective measures come into action when it becomes clear that a bid-
der will own a proportion of shares which will give that bidder control.
Similarly, as for the purposes of securities' regulation it is necessary to
discern corporate affiliations and relationships (such as parent/subsidi-
ary, beneficial ownership) there is recourse to the notion of equity own-
ership. For example, when X owns Y% of another corporation, they
shall be considered affiliates."' 8
The lesson is clear - in all these situations it is assumed that,
where one shareholder has a certain amount of equity ownership (never
all, and not necessarily half) that shareholder has sufficient power to
control the affairs of the corporation and is subjected to certain restric-
tions on that control. If that assumption can be made in the sphere of
regulation, why can it not be made in relation to corporate criminality?
One argument might be that to have potential control is not the same
as exercising that control, but this is not overly persuasive. Securities
(and foreign investment) regulations assume that potential control is
likely to be exercised. Controlling shareholders are given an opportu-
nity to explain their conduct to the regulators. If it is considered be-
nign, it will be permitted."l 9 In the same way, the fact of control ought
to permit the argument that shareholders who can have managers and
policies changed (hence the need to regulate their power) are to be held
accountable for the corporation's wrongdoing unless they can show that
they were uninformed about, and gave no approval to, the wrongful
actors.
This raises a potential counter-argument. It is that shareholding is
often a passive matter, something which gives the owner the right not
to take an active interest.12 0 This begs the question. The reason the
controlling shareholders feel comfortable about leaving such issues to
the managers is precisely because, fines being light, they can be confi-
118 E.g. The Securities Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 466, ss. l(1)(17)(iii), l(1)(11)(iii), 88(1)(b),
1(2), 1(3), 1(4), 1(5), 1(6). For similar provisions defining controlling interests, other than by
more than 50% equity ownership, see Foreign Investment Review Act, R.S.C. 1980, c. 46, e.g. s.
3(2).
'.. E.g. s. 118, The Securities Act.
120 This accords with notions inherent in the absoluteness of private property ownership.
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dent that managerial wrongdoing is unlikely to impinge on them se-
verely. As well, if any individuals are prosecuted, it will be employees
rather than owners. Compare this argument about the assumed lassi-
tude and apathy of major shareholders in respect of corporate affairs
with the assumption of controlling shareholders' keenness to be in-
formed when "their" corporation is being bid for, or its management
seeks to buy into a totally different market. Would securities regula-
tors, potential investors, newspaper reporters, politicians, et al. doubt
that the major shareholders will be put on full alert? Indeed, as the
argument is the essentially legal one which prides itself on understand-
ing and propagating the distinction between ownership and manage-
ment, will it not be a priority for those controlling shareholders' and
the corporation's lawyers to investigate and advise their clients about
such impending action? Thus, the assumption that controlling equity
ownership is a passive thing, unless proved otherwise, turns the issue on
its head. Ownership is always active in that it seeks to protect itself and
to further its profitability. If the starting position is that it makes delib-
erate decisions about how capital is to be deployed, it is logical that it
should be held responsible for any consequences. This is the argument
which is used to protect the investor classes by means of the Securities
Acts, and it is an argument which thus can be used to protect the pub-
lic at large, if this is a serious social objective.
Even if some shareholders have controlling power, it may be ar-
gued, they cannot be expected to exercise it to supervise the daily oper-
ations of the corporation. This contention is one which is often used to
protect chief executive officers and (through them) the corporation
from criminalization. In part, the answer must be as before: it is an
empirical question. While often (perhaps, even, very often) the deviant
conduct is the result of aberrant, peripheral actors, sometimes it is
not.121 If, as is often true, the wrongdoing is alleged and publicized for
a long time before it is finally legally proved, then the claim to igno-
rance, or the continued willingness to believe in the uprightness of
management, is far from convincing.122 In part, the answer is that it
would serve a valid purpose to prosecute and convict controlling share-
holders, even for so-called peripheral behaviour. The reason that they
do not involve themselves in routine operations of the corporations is
because they are permitted to be exactly that: routine. Profit-making
activity goes on and there is no concern with the actual processes. At-
tention is paid, and regulations imposed where necessary, when the
M2 See supra note 116.
22 See supra note 117.
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business at hand is not routine, when it is likely to affect the controlling
owners of the corporation or members of their class. The whole object
of criminalizing corporate wrongdoing is to bring home the point that
profit making cannot be insulated from restrictions imposed to protect
the public from violations of morally important rights, in particular the
right to physical integrity of self and property. The means of making
profit must therefore be weighed directly against this goal. Making
controlling shareholders responsible for what presently are seen as lo-
cal, unauthorized peccadilloes would emphasize the fact that, if share-
holders are willing to take the profit made on their investment, they are
accountable for the method used in its generation.
Lest the last point be seen as too far-fetched, note that the centre
of the argument is that all shareholders benefit from the illicit beha-
viour, whether or not it is subsequently described as unwise, peripheral,
aberrant or unauthorized. That is, shareholders are in possession of
property (usually in converted form) which has been obtained by the
commission of an unlawful act. This will be so whether profits have
been made by means of savings earned by not putting in required qual-
ity controls, pollution-saving devices or by not controlling contami-
nants, or by the use of deceptive practices in the market, or by ob-
taining sales by kick-backs. Being in possession of property (or its
proceeds) obtained by a breach of law is often treated as a crime when
it is the end-product of a street crime (such as breaking and entering,
or theft of an automobile). The crime is completed when the possessor
knows that the property was illegally obtained.12 3 Because such knowl-
edge is difficult to prove, it is presumed that, if the property has been
obtained after the commission of a recent crime, that knowledge ex-
ists.124 It is possible for an accused to rebut the effect of the presump-
tion by adducing contrary evidence which may be true. The require-
ment of recent commission of the crime is a safeguard for accused
persons. The idea is that the presumption arises from the common as-
sumption that persons who have something in their possession know of
its origins and that it is sensible and convenient to ask them to explain
that possession. The requirement of recency relieves the hardship which
would be created where unsophisticated lay persons come into posses-
123 Section 312, The Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34. Note that the offence allows for
the possession of property which has been converted into another form and which is held on behalf
of the accused; ss. 2, 3(4).
124 This is an old common law doctrine, internalized in the offence created by the Criminal
Code, even though the Code does not refer to it; see, e.g. R. v. Graham, [1974] S.C.R. 206, 26
D.L.R. (3d) 579, and see generally McWilliams, Canadian Criminal Evidence (2nd ed., 1984) at
81 et seq.
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sion of goods illegally obtained but which, over time, have gone
through many hands.125
In this context, there is nothing unusual about arguing that ille-
gally obtained profits, being in the possession of the shareholders,
should raise a rebuttable presumption of criminal participation by those
shareholders who could have exercised control over corporate activities.
The argument that it is sensible and convenient to ask possessors of
illegally obtained corporate property to explain away that possession is
analogous to that discussed above. Inasmuch as the requirement of re-
cency will be hard to meet, it can be seen that this safeguard is not
needed. This is so because, unlike the usual recipient of criminally ob-
tained property, the controlling shareholder is in a position to monitor
the conduct which led to the acquisition of the property. 26 It will be
noted that, if this line of reasoning is accepted, the use of criminal law
would have a beneficial effect, one which consensus theorists and re-
formers seek to achieve. Arguably, controlling shareholders will have a
vested interest in creating a system of reporting which will include an
accounting of compliance by the corporation with existing legal re-
quirements other than corporate and securities regulatory provisions. A
reporting scheme which details the manner of profit-making will
ensue.
1 27
Finally, it is conceded that there may well be a great number of
situations in these large diffuse corporate organizations in which there
are no controlling shareholders, at least to the extent that it would
make sense to hold them responsible. Again, this is an empirical issue.
What is certain is that the conventional wisdom that the equity in ma-
jor corporations is widely-held and that, therefore, ownership and man-
125 For a good discussion of the need for a safeguard, see R. v. Boyle (1983), 35 C.R. (3d) 34
(Ont. C.A.).
126 One of the differences between this and the defined offence is that, in the corporate situa-
tion, no tangible property may have been illegally obtained. The distinction between tangible and
intangible property is, of course, one which helps capitalists generally. For instance, it enables the
appropriation of surplus labour by dint of the exchange known as the wage contract. The wage
earner sells something intangible - labour power - which becomes the property of the employer
to do with as preferred. Intangible though this may be, it is the source of the employer's profit and
wealth. The analogy is offered to show that, if an adjustment to the definition of property is
necessary to make it fit the special facts of the corporate deviance, the adjustment required does
not invalidate the logic of the law.
127 Stone's structural remedy, as noted, will pose serious difficulties. Interestingly, Stone,
supra note 87, at 243-45, rejects the social audit, that is a reporting system detailing non-bottom
line activities of the corporation as an unlikely mechanism of reform because of both practical
difficulties and the inherent conflict between the predominance of profit-orientation and social
conscience. Nonetheless, he thought the social audit a good idea. The mechanism offered here
would give this type system a real chance. If prosecution of controlling shareholders is rejected as
an idea, it can be cogently argued that this is an indication that consensus theory, despite its
protestations, is not serious about the universality of criminal law.
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agement are quite separate 28 (which would make the argument in this
section of theoretical interest only) is not borne out in Canada by the
available data. Of the four hundred largest Canadian companies
outside the financial sector, the equity of only twenty-two public corpo-
rations is widely-held. Another seventeen were held by other corpora-
tions and twenty-nine by the Government. The remaining 332 were
controlled by one major shareholder.129
X. SUMMATION
There are no serious legal or conceptual barriers to bringing home
corporate wrongdoing to appropriate actors. Most of the practical bar-
riers are of the objectors' own making. In particular, isolation of the
corporation as the actor, perception of the corporation as just another
organization, the assumption that corporate structure is often too com-
plex and denies discretion to individuals, are all unnecessary and mis-
placed assumptions. Further, there are no good reasons why individu-
als, who benefit from corporate wrongdoing (whether in terms of profit
or sharing in the spoils by career advancement), should not be treated
as responsible for the consequences of corporate wrongdoing. The ad-
justment required to do so does not necessitate radical departures from
existing principles. They are just that: adjustments. A willingness to
make them would indicate that the legal system treats all crime, no
matter who commits it, equally. A lack of willingness to do so, which I
expect to be manifested, would prove the class conflict theorists right:
criminal law exists to subordinate certain classes so that the ruling
class can rule. The ruling class would be seen as no longer constituted
by kings and despots - who were beyond the reach of the law for all
practical purposes - but rather as members of a class which can rule
at one remove through the agency of the corporate structure, largely
immunized from the application of liberal, democratic law.
128 The locus classicus is Berle & Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property
(1932).
12 Financial Post 1980: Annual Reports as offered in evidence by Pierre Lortie, President of
the Montreal Stock Exchange, before the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitu-
tional Affairs, Nov. 30, 1982, Hearings on Bill S-31, An Act to Limit Shareholding in Certain
Corporations. Similar figures are to be found in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver Stock Ex-
changes and the Investment Dealers' Association, The Regulation of Take-over Bids in Canada
- Report of the Securities Industry Committee on Take-Over Bids, (1983). To be sure, often the
controlling shareholder is another corporation which, if it is American, may be diffusely held, but
it is clear that, in Canada, to begin with the Berle & Means argument is to begin from a totally
wrong perspective.
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